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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the relationship between experienced chief executive officers 
(CEOs), venture capital support, and company performance. Much of the success of venture 
backed companies is attributed to the reputation, monitoring, and networking of venture 
capitalists (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu 2007; Katz 2009). One crucial task of venture 
capitalists, or any stakeholder, is to find talented executives to lead their companies. However, 
finding quality CEOs for young growth companies with a relatively short financial history can be 
a difficult endeavor. Venture capitalists may have a comparative advantage in this area because 
they network within the venture capital industry to “recycle” CEOs (De Carvalho, Calomiris, 
and de Matos 2008). In other words, venture capitalists network to hire CEOs who already have 
CEO experience at a different venture backed company.  This provides venture capitalists with a 
unique opportunity to hire serial CEOs with venture capital industry specific experience. 
Therefore, this study considers the following research questions:  
RQ1: Are recycled CEOs of higher ability than other CEOs? 
RQ2: Do recycled CEOs have a positive relationship to future firm performance? 
To address this question, I use a hand collected sample of serial CEOs (CEOs with prior CEO 
experience), and recycled CEOs (serial CEOs of venture backed companies) to examine their 
relationship with managerial ability and future firm performance. Although there is literature to 
support the positive association between CEOs and firm performance (Demerjian et al. 2012; 
Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay 2013), little analysis of recycled CEOs is available. Using 
various univariate and multivariable tests, I find evidence that recycled CEOs have a positive 
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association to future managerial ability and provide incremental explanatory power over venture 
backing with respect to future management quality and firm profitability. These findings provide 
evidence that venture capital success may be due in part to the ability of the CEOs set in place to 
lead the company and not just to venture capitalist oversight.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 “… the Kleiner partners’ role in Silicon Valley may in some ways be close to that of the 
Hollywood moguls of the ‘30s and ‘40s, whose success was built on their ability to lock up 
stars, directors and writers. Kleiner Perkins has similarly amassed a pool of talent. ‘If you’re 
well regarded as a manager in their stable, you’re going to be used over the years” - Frank 
Ingari1 
Finding the right management for companies, especially young companies, is crucial to 
the future success of a company. Talented managers are better at predicting trends, negotiating 
contracts, are more adept at conveying information to interested parties, and more able to turn 
resources into revenues. Venture capitalists are in a unique position to secure talented managers 
for leadership roles in the companies they finance. By networking within the venture capital 
industry, venture capitalists “recycle” talented CEOs with specific skills to lead young growth 
companies. De Carvalho, Calomiris, and de Matos (2008) find that venture capitalists rely on the 
recommendations of other venture capitalists when hiring key managers, then “recycle” or reuse 
them for other startup companies. In other words, venture capitalists network to hire serial CEOs 
with venture experience. Prior literature provides evidence that Serial CEOs – CEOs with prior 
CEO experience – add value to the companies they are chosen to run (Gudell 2011). A recycled 
CEO is a special type of serial CEO, special in that this particular CEO has CEO experience with 
at least one other venture backed company. Simply, recycled CEOs are the serial CEOs of 
venture backed companies (see Figure 1 for an illustration).  
                                                          
1 Per Frank Ingari in Institutional Investor (June 1996), pp. 95-96. Frank Ingari was the CEO of software company, 
Shiva Corp. from 1993 to 1998. Kleiner Perkins (now Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers) is a successful venture 
capital firm based in Menlo Park, CA. Kleiner Perkins has invested in companies such as Uber, MyFitnessPal, and 
Shazam. 
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FIGURE 1 
Illustration of Recycled CEO 
            
 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Figure 1- Illustration of Recycled CEO 
It is possible that the practice of recycling CEOs plays a significant role in the success of 
young growth companies. With new measures of managerial ability, researchers as well as 
investors may now be able to ascertain the differences between venture capital influence and the 
influence of other types of firm leadership, such as CEOs.  
In summary, researchers, investors, as well as venture capitalists are constantly looking 
for information that may give them an advantage and further analysis of the types of CEOs 
selected is an underdeveloped area. Therefore, this dissertation empirically examines if recycled 
CEOs provide benefit to the companies they manage.  
Prior Research 
The venture capital industry is responsible for many successful endeavors that have led to job 
creation, investment opportunities, and innovative technology (Kortum and Lerner 2000). A 
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large portion of accounting and finance literature attributes the success of venture backed 
companies to the activities and characteristics of the venture capitalists who invest in young 
private companies (Sahlman 1988, 1990; Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Bygrave and Timmons 
1992; Gompers 1995; Lerner 1995; Gompers and Lerner 1997; Hellmann and Puri 2002; 
Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann 2008; Cao and Lerner 2009; Lindsey 2008).  
In addition to providing financial support, Venture capitalists provide advice and oversight to 
entrepreneurs (Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Gompers 1995), screen projects (Sahlman 1990), 
and assist entrepreneurs with recruiting key technical and managerial talent (Gorman and 
Sahlman 1989; Hellmann and Puri 2002). Although executive recruitment is an important 
function of venture capital firms (Prowse 1998; Casamatta 2003; Bottazzi et al. 2008), empirical 
analysis of the CEOs of venture backed companies is limited. Lerner (1995) examines venture 
capital (VC) board representation surrounding CEO turnover, Wasserman (2006) examines the 
differences of founder CEOs versus non-founder CEOs of venture backed companies, Hellmann 
and Puri (2002) find evidence that Venture capitalists are more likely to replace founders with 
outside CEOs, De Carvalho, Calomiris, and de Matos (2008) examine the networking activities 
of Venture capitalists when recruiting CEOs, and Chemmanur, Simonyan, and Tehranian (2014) 
examine the relative management quality of venture backed versus non-venture backed 
management teams. None of these articles, however, examine the relationship between the CEOs 
hired and rehired by venture backed companies (recycled) and managerial ability, or their 
relationship to future firm performance.  
There is evidence that venture backed companies do have higher ability managers when 
compared to non-venture backed companies and they tend to outperform their non-venture 
backed counterparts in terms of earnings quality and future returns (Katz 2009; Chemmanur et 
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al. 2014). Venture capitalists with superior networking resources (such as management recruiting 
contacts) are more likely to succeed when bidding for promising portfolio companies (Hsu 
2004), which in turn can make it easier to attract managerial talent.  
When seeking key employees venture capitalists may have a competitive advantage because, 
1) they have experience in the professionalization of start-up companies (Hellman and Puri 2002; 
Cao and Lerner 2009), and 2) they network within the venture capital industry to find talented 
CEOs (De Carvalho et al. 2008). The authors also find evidence to support the view that “venture 
capitalists add value by bringing to their portfolio companies the capacity to attract superior 
management (De Carvalho et al. 2008, p. 245).”  
Research Questions 
This topic is important because the success of young growth companies largely depends on 
their capacity to secure talented key employees and managers. Emerging literature on 
management quality and its effect on firm performance provides researchers with powerful 
statistical tools, thereby increasing the external validity of managerial quality attributes. By 
utilizing a hand collected sample of newly public companies with background information of 
their CEOs, then matching this information to the Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) managerial 
ability score, this dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: 
RQ1: Are recycled CEOs of higher ability than other CEOs? 
RQ2: Do recycled CEOs have a positive relationship to future firm performance? 
Methodology 
This study examines the associations between managerial ability, ownership structure, 
and CEO experience by using univariate tests, ordinary least square regressions, and propensity 
score matching (to address the issue of endogeneity). As a measure of CEO quality, the 
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managerial ability score created by Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) is used. There are three main 
objectives of this study. The first objective is to determine if there is any difference in 
managerial ability between venture backed CEOs, serial CEOs, recycled CEOs and their 
counterparts. Next this study examines the effect of each CEO type on future managerial ability. 
Finally, this study examines the effect of recycled CEOs on future profitability and future buy-
and-hold adjusted returns. 
Findings 
In my analysis, in addition to confirming the significant difference between the 
management quality of venture backed CEOs and the CEOs of non-venture backed companies, I 
also find that venture backed CEOs have significantly higher managerial ability scores than non-
venture backed CEOs. As a proxy of managerial ability, I use the Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) 
managerial ability score. I perform a similar test on serial versus non-serial CEOs and find a 
significant difference in managerial ability between these two groups. Next, I examine the 
association between managerial ability, venture backing, serial CEOs and the interaction of the 
latter two variables – recycled CEOs. Using regression analysis, I find a positive and significant 
relationship between recycled CEOs and the MA-Score for managerial ability. I also find that 
recycled CEOs provide incremental explanatory power to that of venture backing with respect to 
managerial ability. I perform similar analysis between recycled CEOs and return on assets 
(ROA) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). However, I do not find a significant 
relationship between recycled CEOs and future ROA or BHAR. This may be due to the 
introductory or growth stages of the companies in my sample, where trends may be difficult to 
measure in such a short time frame.  
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Limitations 
One limitation of this dissertation is the assumption that venture capitalists find CEOs 
from other venture backed companies solely by networking with other venture capitalists. It is 
possible that CEOs were recruited by head hunters or recommended by people other than venture 
capitalists and that the origin of their CEO experience is unknown.  
Importance and Contributions 
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this study examines the 
interaction of venture backed companies and serial CEOs (recycled CEOs) and its effect on 
future management quality and profitability. Second, I add to the limited literature on venture 
backing and post IPO operating performance. Currently, there are three papers that address this 
topic, the first of which is Jain and Kini (1995) who find that venture backed companies have 
smaller declines in post-IPO operating performance when compared to non-venture backed 
companies. Chemmanur et al. (2014) find that venture backed companies experience significant 
improvements in post IPO performance when compared to non-venture backed companies. And 
Brav and Gompers (1997) find that venture backed IPOs outperform non-venture backed IPOs in 
long run performance. None of these papers, however, address the use of serial or recycled 
CEOs.  
In addition to contributing to the literature on post IPO operating performance, venture 
capital support and serial CEOs, I find evidence that recycled CEOs’ provide incremental 
explanatory power over venture backing and serial CEOs with respect to future managerial 
ability.  Krishnan and Wang define Demerjian et al.’s (2012, 2013) managerial ability measure 
as measuring the “ability in transforming corporate resources to revenues (p.139).” This study 
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provides evidence that in addition to VC monitoring and oversight, the strategic placement of 
recycled CEOs by venture capitalists is also a significant factor in firm success.  
Evidence on how recycled CEOs relative ability to turn resources into revenue is 
important to investors and analysts because this is an important factor in determining future 
income. Venture capitalists now have empirical evidence that the habit of recycling CEOs is 
beneficial to improving future revenues. Entrepreneurs and other small business owners will find 
this information valuable when considering CEOs recruitment or succession. And academics can 
speak to the benefits of recycling CEOs as well as use real world examples of recycled CEOs for 
case studies. Finally, accounting and finance researchers can investigate the associations between 
the managerial ability score in relation to earnings quality and audit quality and recycled CEOs. 
Organization 
This study proceeds as follows. Chapter II is a review of prior literature including 
descriptions of this dissertation’s contributions to the extant literature. Chapter III contains the 
hypothesis development and methodology used in this study. Chapter IV contains a description 
of the results.  Concluding remarks are provided in the last section – Chapter V. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Managerial Ability 
 
Prior research provides evidence that managerial characteristics affect economic outcomes and 
therefore are important to financial accounting research. However, managerial ability, or quality2 
is a difficult concept to measure. Education, compensation, and media mentions have been used 
as proxies for CEO quality (Kaplan et al. 2012; Rajgopal et al. 2006; Milbourn 2003; Gudell 
2011). Many of these measures tend to be noisy and are difficult to attribute to the manager. For 
instance, some measures require a specific event to occur, such as a CEO change. Emerging 
literature on management quality uses quantitative tools such as common factor analysis and data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) to develop more quantitative measures of ability. Using common 
factor analysis, Chemmanur et al. (2014) construct a factored management quality measure based 
on various proxies of management quality.3 They use their measurement to compare the 
management quality of venture backed and non-venture backed companies in their sample. They 
find that managers of venture backed firms are of higher ability than non-venture backed firms. 
However, they fail to consider the effects of serial or recycled CEOs. 
Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) create a measure of managerial quality by first 
implementing a DEA methodology used to measure firm efficiency (Barr and Siems 1997; Berk 
                                                          
2 Although Chemmanur et al. (2014) use the term, managerial “quality,” this measure is synonymous with 
Demerjian, et al.’s managerial “ability” measure (2012, 2013). Both measures analyze the characteristics and 
performance of managers and their effect on firm performance. I will use the terms “quality” and “ability” 
synonymously throughout this paper.  
3 Some proxies that Chemmanur et al. (2014) focus on are, the number of CPAs on the management team, 
management team size, the number of managers who have their MBA and the percent of managers who were 
partners at law firms or accounting firms.  
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and Green 2004; Berk and Stanton 2007; Leverty and Grace 2012). Their analysis dates back to 
1980 and a managerial ability score is created for over 200,0004 firm year observations. 
Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) then examine the association between stock price reactions and 
CEO turnover. They find there is a positive (negative) stock price reaction to the departure of 
low (high) quality CEOs. They find improved future firm performance when a CEO is replaced 
with a “more able” CEO and find a positive association between managerial ability and earnings 
quality.  
Rather than create a managerial ability measure such as Chemmanur et al. (2014) I use 
the Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) managerial ability score by firm year, and match this to my 
hand collected sample of CEOs5. Since this score helps to separate the ability of the manager 
from the firm, I can analyze the contributions of the CEO separate from the venture backed 
company. This measure will provide a metric for the added value of the serial and recycled 
CEOs I examine in this study.   
Serial CEOs  
When firm owners look for leadership and guidance, many turn to serial CEOs (CEOs with prior 
CEO experience). CEOs are responsible for implementing strategic plans, making critical 
decisions, and interfacing with directors and managers, so experience is a valuable attribute. 
Direct work experience provides skills that are not easily learned by other means (Becker 1964; 
Carroll and Mosakowski 1987; Dobrev and Barnett 1999), making experienced CEOs attractive 
                                                          
4 Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) update their dataset periodically with the last update occurring in 2017. “Our newest 
update includes data through 2016; as above, please continue to reference the original article if you use this updated 
dataset.” http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html 
5 Although the Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) managerial ability score is based on the management team, when the 
authors test their measure, the focus is on the CEO. This is because the CEO is deemed the most powerful manager 
and therefore most likely to affect outcomes (Fee and Hadlock 2003). For example, when examining subsequent 
firm performance, Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) find that “replacing CEOs with more (less) able CEOs is associated 
with improvements (declines)” in performance (p. 1229). 
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for young companies. More and more, the CEO is no longer a “company man” who works his 
way up through the various departments of a single company (Gudell 2011). Many companies 
are turning to CEOs outside their companies, who are often hired to change the direction of the 
firm (Hellmann and Puri 2002; Favaro, Karlsson, and Neilson 2010). 
The number of serial CEOs has increased threefold since the 1970s (Murphy and 
Zabojnik 2007). This growth in serial CEOs is an indication that executives with specific CEO 
experience are highly sought after and companies no longer just seek CEOs with internal 
experience. Gudell (2011) identifies 165 serial CEOs at S&P 1500 firms from the year 1992 to 
2007 and Favaro et al. (2010) find that the number of outgoing CEOs with prior CEO experience 
has more than doubled since the early 2000s. There is evidence that company boards actively try 
to match CEOs to their firms’ life cycle: “Some people are better at starting things up, some are 
better at squeezing the most out of them once they are running, and some are better at fixing 
them when they are wrong.”6 
Gudell (2011) finds that serial CEOs are more likely to be hired by underperforming 
firms and she notes that serial CEOs are in higher demand because they tend to have a positive 
effect on future ROA. Parrino (1997) finds that poorly performing firms are more likely to 
replace their CEO with an experienced CEO outside the firm. Their findings imply that serial 
CEOs are of high ability.7 I add to this literature by providing evidence that serial CEOs are 
positively associated with post-IPO future managerial ability, post-IPO.  
                                                          
6 Quote from a senior manager included in the article: Strategic selection: Matching executives to business 
conditions.  (Gerstein and Reisman 1983). 
7 These arguments tend to hold true for a sample of public- to public-company recycled CEOs. See Appendix B for a 
list of recycled CEOs of venture backed public companies and their respective ROAs. Most of the recycled CEOs in 
this smaller sample (public to public company) have a higher ROA at their previous company, compared to the ROA 
of their next public company. This information provides empirical evidence that recycled CEOs are being recruited 
from companies with relatively higher ROAs into distressed companies (companies with lower ROAs). 
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Venture capital and oversight 
 
I also examine a specific type of serial CEO – recycled. De Carvalho, et al. (2008) define 
recycling as venture capitalists “assisting managers with job placement in the future” (p. 226). 
Using a survey, the authors find that venture capitalists network to find and reuse talented 
executives. Further data provided by the survey shows that a substantial proportion of venture 
capitalists “adopt the strategy of recycling managers” within their portfolios (De Carvalho et al 
2008, p. 226).  In other words, venture capitalists recycle managers for their portfolio companies 
by utilizing private equity networks and contacts.  
In addition to assisting entrepreneurs with recruiting key technical and managerial talent 
(Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Hellmann and Puri 2002), venture capitalists provide advice and 
oversight to entrepreneurs (Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Gompers 1995), screen projects and 
structure deals (Sahlman 1990), and closely monitor and stage investments (Gompers, 1995; 
Lerner, 1995; Sahlman, 1990). These activities are designed to protect the interests of the venture 
capitalists and increase the likelihood of a successful venture (Sahlman 1990).  
One important aspect of venture success is having a strong executive team. Wasserman 
(2003) finds that sometimes venture capitalists expect the founder-CEO “to start the company 
and get it going” (p. 152), but before further investment, these venture capitalists may require the 
placement of an outside CEO. If venture capitalists believe that CEO replacement is necessary, 
looking for a CEO who already has CEO experience at a venture backed company may be a 
good strategy. De Carvalho et al. (2008) confirm that many venture capitalists participate in this 
practice. There is also evidence that this practice works. Chemmanur et al. (2014) examine the 
management quality of venture backed versus non-venture backed CEOs and find that CEOs of 
venture backed companies are of higher quality than CEOs of non-venture backed companies. 
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However, unlike this study, Chemmanur et al. (2014) make no distinction between serial or 
recycled CEOs.  
The empirical evidence that serial CEOs and venture backed CEOs are of high ability 
suggests that a recycled CEO adds explanatory power beyond VC influence. This also implies 
that it is not necessarily the venture capitalists making their CEOs “look good,” but the venture 
capitalists are bringing in talented CEOs via recycling to improve firm performance. Prior 
literature however, focuses mainly on VC involvement and oversight as the main driver of 
venture performance (Sahlman 1990; Katz 2009). I however take a different approach: it is 
possible that the main driver of venture company success is the CEO and not just VC oversight. I 
provide evidence to support this. 
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III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation seeks to determine the effects of ownership structure and CEO ability on 
future firm performance. Owners and investors understand the importance of CEO leadership for 
the success of a company but for newly public companies, where information is sparse, 
knowledge of CEO experience or ability can help to reduce information asymmetry for young 
companies. Therefore, this dissertation first tests whether there is a positive association between 
CEO experience and managerial ability. Specifically, are serial CEOs of higher ability than non-
serial CEOs and does venture backing play a role in any differences? The dissertation ultimately 
seeks to see if there is a relationship between the serial CEOs of venture backed companies 
(recycled CEOs), managerial ability, and future firm performance.   
The Relationship between CEO Experience and Managerial Ability 
Human capital theory posits that skills learned from direct work experience are not easily 
learned from other means (Becker 1964), and executives build expertise through experience at 
multiple organizations and roles; expertise that can be applied to entrepreneurial settings (Dobrev 
and Barnet 1999). Experienced executives tend to be better at conveying confidence (Wasserman 
2003) which can make it easier to attract resource providers (Nohria 1988). Because of these 
attributes, CEOs with experience (serial CEOs) are valued. Gudell (2011) finds that serial CEOs 
earn a higher level of compensation than non-serial CEOs and are hired to help with 
underperforming firms. She argues that these activities are an indication that serial CEO skills 
are valued and are therefore of high ability. However, there is evidence that first year CEO 
overstate expenses and losses then attribute this poor performance to the prior CEO, thereby 
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setting the stage to take credit for better performance in the future (Strong and Meyer 1987; 
Elliott and Shaw 1988; DeAngelo, 1988; Pourciau, 1993). This first-year effect may be 
exacerbated by the fact that serial CEOs tend to be hired to improve underperforming firms 
(Gudell 2011; Parrino 1997)8. But there is also evidence that CEOs are often able to emulate 
good results in the short-term (Kedia and Philippon 2009). Due to the conflicting evidence of 
serial CEOs and their association to management ability, I state the following hypotheses in null 
form: 
H1: There will be no difference between the CEO ability (MA-Score) of serial CEOs and 
non-serial CEOs. 
 
De Carvalho et al. (2008) survey venture capitalists and find that they network to find and place 
talented managers (recycle) within venture capital networks. Based on the results of the authors’ 
survey, I use hand collected information to create a variable to represent the recycling of CEOs. 
A recycled CEO has CEO experience with at least two venture backed companies. For instance, 
if a CEO of a venture backed company also has prior CEO experience at another venture backed 
company, I consider this CEO to be recycled.9 An illustration of the Recycle variable is shown in 
Figure 1.  
Apart from the De Carvalho et al. (2008) study, there is very little research on recycled 
CEOs. However, since recycled CEOs are the serial CEOs of venture backed firms, this study 
relies on venture capital and serial CEO theory. Venture capitalists can manage many companies 
                                                          
8 To determine if serial CEOs are brought in to assist with distressed companies, a spreadsheet is created to 
specifically look at the ROAs of CEOs leaving one public company then joining another company. Of the 12 CEOs 
who left one company for another, 9 had higher ROAs at their prior company. In other words, most of the CEOs 
were brought in to companies with lower (comparatively distressed) ROAs. See Appendix B. The same type of 
analysis was done for the CEO’s MA-Score. The opposite was true for the MA-Score. See Appendix C.  
9 I use Crunchbase.com to determine if a CEO’s company is backed by a venture capital firm. Each company has a 
list of investors by name and by round and date of investment. If venture capital support is received prior to IPO, 
this firm is considered venture backed. If this information was not available, I did not include the company in the 
sample. Crunchbase.com has been used in published journal articles for Hellmann and Thiele (2015), as well as 
other periodicals (Ingham 2014; Columbus 2016). 
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at different life cycle stages. The various companies in these portfolios most likely have different 
needs depending on their stage of development. Therefore, venture capitalists  may seek CEOs 
with certain talents or experience. Talented CEOs with specific experiences will most likely be 
recruited by many companies. Because young growth companies tend to be risky, venture 
capitalists may be able to offer a “safety net” in the form of future placement at another portfolio 
company in the event of a merger, acquisition, or bankruptcy. De Carvalho et al. (2008) label this 
benefit “employment insurance” and argue that this type of insurance may be attractive to 
talented CEOs. Therefore, it is plausible that recycled CEOs will be of high ability. Because 
there is very little research on the ability of recycled CEOs, the following hypotheses are stated 
in the null:  
H2: There will be no difference between the CEO ability (MA-Score) of recycled CEOs 
(Recycle) and non-recycled CEOs. 
The Relationship of Ownership Structure and Managerial ability 
Chemmanur et al. (2014) examine over 3,000 IPO firms for the years 1993 to 2004 and 
find that the management team of venture backed companies tend to be of higher ability than the 
management team of non-venture backed companies. Although the authors examine entire senior 
management groups and focus on the characteristics of the entire management team in their 
sample, this high ability should translate to CEO ability as well.   
Venture capitalists screen projects, structure deals (Sahlman 1990), and closely monitor 
and stage investments (Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995; Sahlman, 1990). These activities are 
designed to protect the interests of the venture capitalists and increase the likelihood of a 
successful venture (Sahlman 1990). This type of support and guidance may enhance the ability 
of management. As CEO tenures shorten, venture capital networking can provide a type of 
recruitment tool to potential managers. This type of networking, within the venture capital 
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industry, can also provide a type of “employment insurance” (De Carvalho et al. 2008). In other 
words, a venture backed company may be more attractive to talented CEOs due to the possibility 
of a seamless transition to another venture backed company in the event of a merger, acquisition, 
or failure.   
In summary, because talented managers are in high demand, venture capitalists can use 
their networks and the possibility of seamless future employment as an advantage when 
recruiting talented managers for young growth companies. Therefore, since venture capitalists 
use venture capital networks to gather information about top managers, and venture capital firms 
may be better equipped to provide future employment in the event of a successful or 
unsuccessful exit, the next hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: Venture backing will have a positive relationship with future CEO ability (MA-
Score). 
 
Many serial CEOs are sought after to assist with distressed companies (Gudell 2011) or they are 
brought in for their expertise in certain stages of a company’s life (Wasserman 2003). Because 
CEOs can be brought in for specific tasks or different stages in a company’s life, many talented 
CEOs lose employment through no fault of their own. CEOs of venture backed companies 
sometimes become available because a significant number of venture capital investments are 
acquired by other corporations (Black and Gilson 1998) and the acquiring corporations generally 
do not need a senior management team (De Carvalho et al. 2008). Therefore, it is not uncommon 
for CEO tenure to be short-lived. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) find that CEO tenure has 
decreased from about 8 years to less than four years since the 1980s and this tenure may be even 
shorter for young growth companies. 
H4: Serial CEOs will have a positive relationship with future CEO ability (MA-Score).  
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De Carvalho et al.’s (2008) survey also provides evidence that venture capitalists value CEOs. 
When venture capitalists were asked if they agreed with the statement: “The success of the type 
of firms I fund depends mostly on their top managers (p. 236), more than 95 percent of the 
responding venture capitalists Agreed or Strongly Agreed with the statement.10 Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that venture capitalists will use networked industry information to find 
talented CEOs with specific skills, and talented CEOs will want to work for owners within strong 
industry networks.  
H5: Recycled CEOs (Recycle) will have a positive relationship with future CEO ability 
(MA-Score). 
 
Recycled CEOs are an interaction of venture backing and serial CEOs. Venture capitalists 
provide a valuable service to companies they invest in, and serial CEOs are hired for their talents 
and abilities. Because a recycled CEO, in general, should have the benefit venture support and 
experience, their involvement should add value above and beyond the effects of venture backing 
and serial CEOs. Therefore, the next hypothesis is 
H6: Recycled CEOs (Recycle) will have a positive incremental relationship with CEO 
ability (MA-Score). 
The Relationship between CEO experience and Future Firm Performance 
Prior literature on post IPO performance tends to focus on ownership structure (venture backed 
versus non-venture backed) with little focus on executive leadership. Chemmanur et al. (2014) 
do look at management team quality but do not focus on CEOs or make a distinction between 
serial or recycled CEOs. They find that venture backed companies experience significant 
improvements in their post-IPO performance (relative to the year prior to their IPO), while non-
venture backed companies experience a deterioration. They also find that high quality managers 
                                                          
10 71.1 percent “Strongly Agreed,” and 24.4 percent “Agreed.”  
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of venture backed companies experience significantly larger improvements in post-IPO operating 
performance. Jain and Kini (1995) analyze a sample of IPOs and find that venture backed 
companies have smaller declines in post-IPO operating performance when compared to non-
venture backed companies, and Brav and Gompers (1997) find that venture backed IPOs 
outperform non-venture backed IPOs in long run performance. Gudell (2011) finds that serial 
CEOs are more likely to be hired by underperforming firms but tend to have a positive effect on 
future ROA. Parrino (1997) also finds that poorly performing firms are more likely to replace 
their CEO with an experienced CEO from outside the firm. Recycled CEOs are a specific type of 
serial CEO and because recycled CEOs also have the benefit of venture support, these CEOs 
should have a positive effect on future performance. I state the following hypothesis as follows: 
H7: Recycled CEOs (Recycle) will have a positive incremental relationship with the 
change in future firm profitability (ChgROAt+1, t+3).  
 
Katz (2009) finds that private equity backed firms exhibit superior long-term stock price 
performance after they go public. Chemmanur et al. (2014) argue that managers of high ability 
may be able to select better long-term projects and implement these projects better than a 
manager of lower quality. And this ability, the authors argue, will most likely affect post-IPO 
performance in a positive way. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) reason that companies with 
higher quality managers have a better chance of being associated with more reputable 
underwriters, which can translate into lower costs and ultimately lead to better post IPO 
performance. Venture backing can also convey value to the market which can translate into 
higher post IPO returns.   
H8: Recycled CEOs (Recycle) will be positively associated with future returns (BHAR 
t+1, t+3).  
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Methodology 
 
This dissertation seeks to ascertain whether or not recycled CEOs (serial CEOs of venture 
backed companies) play a significant role in the future performance of post IPO companies. 
Although there have been studies that provide evidence of the high ability of venture backed 
managers, no study has examined the role of recycled CEOs in future firm performance and their 
association with managerial ability.  
 This study first examines venture backed companies and serial CEOs separately since 
each plays a factor in the characteristic of a recycled CEO. Before examining the advantages or 
disadvantages of recycled CEOs, this dissertation first examines the relationships between 
venture backing, serial CEOs and managerial ability.  
Test of Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis 1 (H1) states that there will be no difference between the 
management quality of serial CEOs and non-serial CEOs. To examine this hypothesis I perform 
a t-test to determine if there is a significant difference between the means of the managerial 
ability score of serial CEOs versus non-serial CEOs. I also examine other characteristics of serial 
CEOs versus non-serial CEOs, by testing the mean difference of ROA, CEO age, firm age and 
firm size. A Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is also performed on the differences in the medians of the 
variables examined in the t-test.   
Test of Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis (H2) states that there will be no difference between the CEO 
ability of recycled CEOs and non-recycled CEOs. To examine this hypothesis I perform a t-test 
to determine if there is a significant difference between the means of the managerial ability score 
of recycled CEOs versus non-recycled CEOs. To examine other characteristics of recycled CEOs 
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versus non-recycled CEOs, I also test the mean difference of ROA, CEO Age, Firm Age and 
Firm Size. A Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is also performed on the differences in the medians 
Test of Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) states that venture backing will have a positive relationship with future 
CEO ability. To examine hypothesis H3, I use regression analysis. As a proxy for CEO ability I 
use the MA-Score created by Demerjian et al. (2012). The MA-Score is measured at year end and 
is an indication of the ability of the manager during the year. Venture backing is associated with 
the recruitment of qualified managers (Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Hellmann and Puri 2002), 
therefore, I examine managerial quality one-year, and then three-years post IPO. I examine both 
industry-adjusted and non-industry-adjusted variables.11 I industry adjust all continuous variables 
by grouping the dataset by industry code, calculating the mean by industry, then subtracting the 
respective mean from the variable amount. The model below examines the association between 
venture backing and managerial ability. 
MA-Scoret +1,t+3 = β0 + β1VB + β2CEO_Aget + β3LOG_AGEt+ β4LOG_SIZEt+ ɛ12         (1) 
The dependent variable, MA-Score, is a measure of the managerial ability in public 
companies dating back to 1980. Developed and calculated by Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013), the 
dataset is available on Peter Demerjian’s website. The authors’ latest file is for the period 1980 
to 2015 and has over 200,000 firm year observations. I merge their dataset with the hand 
collected sample in this study by firm year to create the final dataset.  
                                                          
11 All continuous variables in all regressions are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  
12 In addition to using firm size and firm age as control variables, Chemmanur et al. (2014) used the proportion of 
outside directors on the board of directors (ODIR), the proportion of voting power owned by firm officers and 
directors prior to the IPO (INSIDERB), as well as an indicator variable for CEO duality (BOSS). Due to data 
constraints (hand collection), I have omitted these variables at this time.   
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My variable of interest for H3, VB, is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is employed 
by a venture backed company and 0 otherwise. Because there is evidence that venture backed 
firms tend to have higher managerial quality (Chemmanur et al. 2014), a positive association to 
managerial ability is expected. The first control variable  is CEO age (CEO_Age) which serves as 
a proxy for experience and financial statement quality (Huang et al. 2012). Therefore, more 
experienced CEOs have higher financial quality and therefore should have a higher managerial 
ability score. A positive relationship to managerial ability is expected.  
Prior research uses firm age (LOG_AGE) and firm size (LOG_SIZE), as proxies of firm 
quality (Ritter 1984; Michaely and Shaw 1994; Chemmanur et al. 2014). LOG_AGE is defined 
as the natural logarithm of one plus the firm’s age.13 Here firm age is measured from the 
founding year rather than the year of the IPO. Firm age is calculated from the start date of the 
company and not the IPO date, management quality may not be high. Chemmanur et al. (2014) 
find a negative relationship between firm age and management quality. The authors reason that 
firms with better managers are able to shorten the time between the founding year and the initial 
public offering. Because of these findings, a negative association between firm age and CEO 
quality (MA-Score) is expected. Log_Size is defined as the natural logarithm of market value of 
equity (MVE). Due to the findings of  Ritter (1984) and Michaely and Shaw (1994), the 
relationship between size and managerial ability is expected to be positive. These authors argue 
that managers of larger firms have more resources, and better managers tend to be hired at larger 
firms. The intercept captures the effect of non-venture backed CEOs. If H1 is supported, the beta 
(β1) of my variable of interest (VB) will be positive and significant.  
For a complete list of variables and their definitions, please see Appendix A. 
                                                          
13 Firm age is measured from the founding year rather than the year of the IPO.  
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Test of Hypothesis 4  
Hypothesis 4 states that Serial CEOs will have a positive relationship with future CEO 
quality. As in H3, my dependent variable is managerial ability (MA-Score) measured at one- and 
three-years post IPO. To determine if there is a positive relationship between serial CEOs and 
future managerial ability, I use the regression model shown here: 
MA-Scoret+1,t+3 = β0 + β1SERIAL + β2CEO_Aget + β3LOG_AGE + β4LOG_SIZE + ɛ    (2) 
This model examines the association between serial CEOs and future managerial ability. 
Serial CEOs tend to be hired for their abilities to improve the performance of their new 
company. However, there is evidence that first year CEOs may overstate expenses to make their 
future performance seem better. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the direction of the coefficient 
of the indicator variable SERIAL. My variable of interest, SERIAL, is a dummy variable coded 1 
if the CEO has prior CEO experience and 0 otherwise. CEO_Age serves as a proxy for 
experience and financial statement quality. Also described above, I use firm age (LOG_AGE) 
and firm size (LOG_SIZE) as control variables. Here the intercept captures the effect of non-
serial CEOs.  
Test of Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 (H5) states that recycled CEOs will have a positive relationship with future 
CEO ability. Again, the dependent variable is managerial ability (MA-Score) one-year and three-
years post IPO. Non-industry adjusted variables are examined since the MA-Score is already 
industry adjusted. To examine if recycled CEOs have an effect on managerial ability the 
regression model shown below is used: 
MA-Scoret+1,t+3  = β0 + β1RECYCLE+ β2CEO_Aget + β3LOG_AGE + β4LOG_SIZE + ɛ           (3)     
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The variable of interest, RECYCLE, is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a recycled 
and 0 otherwise. As with hypothesis H1 and H2, the control variables are for firm age 
(LOG_AGE) and firm size (LOG_SIZE). CEO_Age is also included as a proxy for CEO 
experience and financial statement quality. The intercept captures the effect of non-recycled 
CEOs, or rather, CEOs that are not or were not CEOs at a different venture backed company. 
Recycled CEOs have the benefit of venture backing, but because they are also serial CEOs, their 
effect could be positive or negative. Therefore, the association between recycled CEOs (β1) and 
managerial ability (MA-Score) could be positive or negative. 
In addition to univariable tests, and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, a 
propensity score matching analysis is performed to compare the management quality of recycled 
and non-recycled CEOs. It is possible that the ability to hire a talented CEO with industry 
specific skills is not entirely exogenous and may depend on the characteristics of the recruiting 
company.  Thus, similar companies will be able to hire equally skilled CEOs. Comparing firms 
that hire recycled CEOs to similar firms that hire non-recycled CEOs may temper the effects of 
endogeneity. In other words, matching on the propensity of a company’s ability (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983), in this case the ability to hire a talented CEO, could help to reduce any comparison 
bias.   
CEO selection is not completely exogenous and may be affected by other factors such as 
the age of the company and size of the company. Therefore, a propensity score analysis is 
performed to address possible endogeneity concerns. Firms are matched on their propensity of 
receiving the treatment. For purposes of this study it is the propensity to hire a serial CEO. 
Matching uses the one-to-one “nearest neighbors” propensity score matching technique. In the 
first stage, logit regressions are run with the dependent variable equal to 1 for firms with 
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recycled CEOs and 0 otherwise. For the model, the set of independent (matching) variables are 
firm size, firm age, and ROA. Next the mean differences between management quality and 
performance variables are calculated for the propensity score matched firms.  
Test of Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 (H6) states recycled CEOs will have an incremental effect on future CEO 
ability. To capture the incremental effect of recycled CEOs, venture backing (VB) and serial 
CEOs are included as control variables. This incremental effect should be over and above 
venture backing and serial CEOs. To examine if recycled CEOs have an incremental effect on 
future managerial ability the regression model shown here is used:                                               
MA-Scoret+1,t+3  = β0 + β1VB + β2SERIAL + β3RECYCLE + β4CEO_Age + β5LOG_AGE 
+ β6LOG_SIZE + ɛ                    (4) 
As described above, the indicator variables VB, and SERIAL are included with  
RECYCLE. The RECYCLE variable represents a serial CEO (SERIAL) with CEO experience for 
at least two venture backed (VB) companies. As earlier, the model controls for CEO age 
(CEO_Age), firm age (LOG_AGE), and firm size (LOG_SIZE). The intercept captures the effect 
of CEOs that are not at venture backed companies nor have had a prior CEO position at a 
different venture backed company. If H6 is supported, the beta (β3) of my variable of interest 
(RECYCLE) will be positive and significant.   
Test of Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 (H7) states that recycled CEOs will have a positive incremental relationship 
with the change in future firm profitability one- and three-years post IPO. To examine the 
relationship between recycled CEOs and the change in future profitability (ROA) the model 
regresses the future change in ROA (ChgROAt+1, t+3) on my variables of interest and other 
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independent variables. The first control variable is current ROA (net income before 
extraordinary items scaled by total assets) and I expect a positive association to the change in 
future ROA. Next, I control for the change in ROA, defined as current ROA less prior year ROA 
and expect a negative relationship to future ROA. The managerial ability score is also controlled 
for and should have a positive effect on future profitability (Demerjian et al. 2012, 2013; 
Chemmanur et al. 2014). I include the indicator variable RECYCLE to examine the effect of 
venture backed serial CEOs on the change in future profitability. Because RECYCLE has 
components of both venture backing and serial CEOs, I include these two variables as well (VB 
and SERIAL). Finally, the intercept captures the profitability effect of CEOs that are not serial 
nor employed by venture backed companies. I estimate the model below for the change in ROA 
one-year and three-years ahead. 
ChgROAt+1,t+3 = β0 + β1VB + β2SERIAL + β3RECYCLEt + β4CEO_Aget + β5MA-Scoret + 
β6ROAt + β7ChgROAt  + ɛ                  (5) 
This model examines whether there is an effect of recycled CEOs on the change in future 
firm performance (ChgROA). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to control for cross-
sectional correlation and intertemporal correlation. The change is measured as ROA one-year-
ahead (and three-years-ahead). To control for managerial ability, I also include the MA-Score 
examined earlier. VB, SERIAL, and RECYCLE are defined above. If H7 is supported, the beta 
(β3) of my variable of interest (RECYCLE) will be positive and significant.  
Test of Hypothesis 8 
Hypothesis 8 (H8) states that recycled CEOs will have a positive effect on future 
abnormal returns (BHAR). BHAR is the value-weighted (3-digit SIC mean) adjusted returns 
cumulated from the beginning of the fourth month of year t+1 through the end of the third month 
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of year t+2.  This length of time is used to ensure that published financial statement data is 
available to investors. I control for common risk factors associated with abnormal returns such as 
beta, book-to-market (BM), size (market value of equity), and momentum (cumulative stock 
return over the prior six months; Fama and French 1993; Carhart 1997). I estimate the following 
regression on annual returns: 
BHARt+1, t+3 = β0 + β 1VB + β2SERIAL + β3RECYCLE + β4MA-Scoret + β5BETAt + β6BMt 
+  β7SIZEt  +  β8MOMENTUMt + Ꜫt                           (6) 
The next model (model 7) is similar to model 6, except this expanded model controls for 
performance anomalies from prior literature. The fully controlled model is shown here:  
BHARt+1,t+3 = β0 + β1VB + β2SERIAL + β3RECYCLE + β4BETAt + β5∆BMt + β6SIZEt +      
β7MOMENTUMt + β8∆WCt + β9∆NCOt + β10∆FINt + β11CapExt + β12CFOt + β13CFIt  
+ β14CFFt + Ꜫt                    (7) 
These anomalies are addressed as so: because accruals affect future earnings (hence 
performance) and some accruals are less reliable (persistent) than others, I use the decomposition 
of total accruals proposed by Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005): the change in non-
cash working capital (ChgWC), the change in net non-current operating assets (ChgNCO) and 
the change in net financial assets (ChgFin). The change in net financial assets is considered the 
most reliable accrual when compared to ChgWC and ChgNCO, however, I include all three as 
control variables to capture maximum effects.  
Capital expenditures (CapEx) are positively related to performance (McConnell and 
Muscaraella 1985, Lev and Thiagarajan 1993) so I control for the level of CapEx. Finally, since 
operating, investing and financing activities differentially affect stock returns (Livnat and 
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Zarowin 1990) I control for cash flows from operations (CFO), cash flows from investing 
activities (CFI), and cash flows from financing activities (CFF).14  
                                                          
14 Detailed definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix A. 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
 This dissertation evaluates the impact of the serial CEOs of venture backed companies 
(recycled CEOs). While the academic literature has explored the differences in the managerial 
ability of venture backed versus non-venture backed managers (Chemmanur et al. 2014), there is 
very little literature that delves into the venture capital practice of recycling CEOs and its 
relationship to managerial quality and future firm performance. First, to explore this relationship, 
a hand collected sample of newly public companies, ownership structure, and future firm 
performance was examined.  
Sample Data, Descriptive Statistics, and Correlations  
The sample for this study consists of all IPO firms for the years 2008 to 2015. This sample 
period was selected because firms seeking public status in 2008 were most likely not affected by 
the 2008 financial crisis. The sample period ends in 2015 because the Demerjian et al. (2012, 
2013) managerial ability score measure used in this study is available through 2015. The 
Crunchbase15 database is used to identify IPOs listed on the AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE stock 
exchanges. Using the stock symbols collected from Crunchbase, firm-years that changed fiscal 
year ends and firms without corresponding Compustat and CRSP data are removed. Using the 
managerial ability (MA-Score) dataset available on Peter Demerjian’s website,16 the Crunchbase 
                                                          
15 Crunchbase lists funding rounds, as well as investors of each company. For example, for the public firm Zynga, 
Crunchbase reports when the stock went public (December 16, 2011) the founders (Mark Pincus), if venture backed, 
the investors (Andreessen Horowitz), and the current executive team (CEO, CFO, VPs, etc.). 
https://www.crunchbase.com/ 
16 Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) calculate the  MA-Score for thousands of public firms and makes this information 
available on his website: (http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html). This score is updated periodically. The 
latest file is through 2016. 
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information is merged with the corresponding Compustat/CRSP dataset. Leveraged buyouts, 
mergers, acquisitions, subsidiaries, and observations missing necessary information are removed 
as well as observations with negative book-to-market (BM) values. The final sample of 1,169 
firm year observations is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 - Sample Selection 
CEO prior place of employment, job title, and tenure are hand collected from the IPO company’s 
prospectus17. If the required information is not available on the company’s prospectus then the 
Crunchbase website, company biography websites, Bloomberg.com and/or LinkedIn are used for 
the hand collected information. If a CEO has prior CEO experience at a previous company, this 
CEO is considered a serial CEO and coded as 1 (0 otherwise). Crunchbase is then used to 
                                                          
17 https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml by company name or tic. 
Label Firm-year observations
All Compustat data for the sample period Cumulative
2008-2015 (not missing gvkey) 72,479 72,479     
Firm-years in which a firm changed FYE 158            72,321
Firm-years without corresponding Compustat or CRSP data 15,048       57,273     
Firm-years without corresponding MA-scores or missing score 29,181       28,092     
Companies with data listed prior to 2018 25,531       2,561       
LBOs, mergers, acquisitions, subsidiaries 1,335         1,226       
Observations with negative book-to-market 47              1,179       
Obversations missing regression variables 10              
Final sample 1,169         * 1,169       
TABLE 1
Sample Selection
Notes:  Table 2 presents the details of the sample obtained from merging the Compustat and 
CRSP databases with the Demerjian et al. (2012) managerial ability database and my hand 
collected sample of CEOs. The final sample number includes Crunchbase information with 
corresponding Compustat, CRSP and MA-score data. 
LESS:
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determine if the CEO’s company is venture backed or non-venture backed. Venture backed 
companies are coded 1 (0 otherwise). If a CEO of a venture backed company has prior CEO 
experience at another venture backed company, this CEO is considered Recycled and coded 1 (0 
otherwise). The final sample consists of 379 distinct CEOs and 300 distinct companies as shown 
in Table 2.  
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Pooled Sample
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Min Max
MA-Score 300    0.012 0.152 -0.078 -0.020 0.056 -0.233 0.634
CEO Age 300    56 8 51 56 61 31 79
Firm Age 300    2.7 0.6 2.3 2.7 3.0 1.1 4.6
MVE 300    6.4 1.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 1.9 10.5
ROA 300    -0.072 0.222 -0.139 0.000 0.056 -2.072 0.375
BM 300    0.466 0.673 0.151 0.289 0.540 0.004 9.154
BHAR 300    0.107 0.713 -0.298 0.004 0.338 -0.936 7.818
Price 300    22.94 22.82 7.58 17.02 29.22 0.49 185.83
CFI 300    -0.109 0.237 -0.127 -0.051 -0.015 -2.501 0.747
CFF 300    0.089 0.247 -0.007 0.017 0.138 -1.271 2.326
Momen 300    0.018 0.067 -0.020 0.017 0.052 -0.251 0.390
Tenure 300    8.9 5.4 5.0 8.0 12.0 1.0 38.0
VB 0.565 0.496
Serial 0.443 0.497
Recycled 0.126 0.332
Total CEOs 379    
Firm Year 1,169 
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for 300 companies and 1,169 firm-year observations from 
the years 2008 through 2015. The final sample also includes 379 distinct CEOs. The market value 
of equity (MVE) and Firm Age are reported in natural log form. See Appendix A for all other 
variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 9th percentiles. 
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Summary statistics are presented in Table 2 and appear consistent with prior literature. 
Approximately half of the sample consists of firm years that are venture backed (0.565) and 
approximately half have serial CEO activity (0.443), and more than twelve percent of the sample 
firm years represent recycled CEOs (0.126). The reported statistics for the MA-Score are: 
standard deviation (0.152), 25th percentile (-0.070), median (-0.020), and 75th percentile (0.056) 
are all comparable to the reported Demerjian et al.’s (2012, 2013) MA-Score statistics (0.149, -
0.094,  
-0.013, and 0.075, respectively). One distinct difference is the mean of the MA-Score. The mean 
MA-Score used in this study is (0.012) whereas the mean MA-Score for Demerjian et al. (2012, 
2013) is (-0.004). This difference can be explained by the different make-up of each sample used 
in both studies. The sample used in this study gathers information from young growth 
companies, whereas Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) do not make this distinction and use 
companies at different stages in their life. For instance, if a company is declining or heading into 
decline, the corresponding MA-Score will most likely be negative.  
Also see Figure 2 for the different MA-Score distributions for venture backed versus non-
venture backed CEOs. The venture backed histogram is more skewed to the right showing a 
more positive distribution. Figure 3 represents the change in MA-Score. The distributions for 
venture backed and non-venture backed are very similar and both are somewhat normal.                                          
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Figure 2 - Comparative Analysis of the Change in MA-Score by Backing 
FIGURE 2
Comparative Analysis of the Change In MA-Score by Backing
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Figure 3 - Comparative Analysis of the Change in MA-Score by Backing 
 
 
Figure 4 presents a histogram for the MA-Score for serial CEOs versus non-serial CEOs. 
Both histograms are right skewed with the serial CEOs having more negative numbers.  
FIGURE 3
Comparative Analysis of the Change In MA-Score by Backing
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Figure 4 - Comparative Analysis of MA-Score by Serial Non-Serial 
 
Figure 5 presents a histogram for the MA-Score for recycle CEOs versus non-recycle CEOs. 
Both histograms are right skewed with the recycle CEOs having fewer negative numbers.  
FIGURE 4
Comparative Analysis of MA-Score by Serial Non-Serial
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Figure 5 - Comparative Analysis of MA-Score by Recycle Non-Recycle 
 
For univariate correlations (Table 3), the main variable of interest, Recycle, is significant 
and positively correlated to the managerial ability (MA-Score) (Spearman, 0.093). This indicates 
that recycled CEOs have a positive association to managerial ability. Venture backing (VB) also 
has a significant and positive correlation to managerial ability (Spearman, 0.121). This finding is 
supported by Chemmanur et al. (2014) as they find that higher quality CEOs are associated with 
venture backed companies. Serial CEOs, however, have a significant and negative correlation to 
FIGURE 5
Comparative Analysis of MA-Score by Recycle Non-Recycle
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managerial ability (-0.095) which may seem counter to their perceived ability. Gudell (2011) 
argues that serial CEOs are valued by their employers because the serial CEOs, on average, 
receive higher compensation packages than non-serial CEOs. The author also provides evidence 
that serial CEOs are hired into distressed companies, which could account for an unfavorable 
contemporaneous MA-Score. Another possible explanation could be that new CEOs take 
advantage of their new position. Researchers provide evidence that some first year CEOs 
overstate expenses and losses then attribute this poor performance to the prior CEO. Researchers 
surmise that this act may occur because CEOs want their future performance to be perceived as a 
major improvement during their tenure (Strong and Meyer 1987; Elliott and Shaw 1988; 
DeAngelo, 1988; Pourciau, 1993). The negative correlation between serial CEOs and ROA 
(Spearman -0.169) is also supported in the literature. Prior research finds that serial CEOs tend to 
be brought in to help distressed companies or to improve company performance (Gudell 2011; 
Parrino 1997).  
Recycled CEOs (RECYCLE) also have a significant and negative correlation to ROA 
(Pearson -0.148). Although there is no prior literature on this particular type of relationship, it 
would seem reasonable that recycled CEOs are also brought in to help distressed companies or 
help to improve performance. Another correlation similar to prior research is the significant and 
positive correlation of 0.327 (Spearman) for MA-Score and ROA. The correlation for MA-Score 
and ROA for Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) is 0.336. Overall, the variables of interest in this 
study (venture backing, serial CEOs and Recycled CEOs) bear a significant relationship to 
managerial ability and ROA.  
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Table 3 - Spearman and Pearson Correlation Coefficients
  
MA-Score VB Serial Recycle ROA BHAR CEO Age Firm Age Size BM Price CFI CFF Momen Tenure
MA-Score 1.000 0.121 -0.095 0.093 0.327 0.044 -0.129 -0.015 0.242 -0.222 0.194 0.092 -0.064 0.009 0.039
<.0001 0.001 0.001 <.0001 0.132 <.0001 0.615 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.002 0.029 0.771 0.187
VB 0.082 1.000 0.087 0.337 -0.307 0.021 -0.238 -0.004 0.054 -0.325 0.087 0.197 0.138 0.047 0.164
0.005 0.003 <.0001 <.0001 0.473 <.0001 0.892 0.067 <.0001 0.003 <.0001 <.0001 0.109 <.0001
Serial -0.092 0.087 1.000 0.430 -0.169 -0.013 0.212 -0.140 -0.024 0.021 -0.071 -0.025 0.050 0.005 -0.146
0.002 0.003 <.0001 <.0001 0.668 <.0001 <.0001 0.417 0.463 0.015 0.398 0.085 0.859 <.0001
Recycle 0.080 0.337 0.430 1.000 -0.202 0.014 -0.048 -0.112 -0.008 -0.121 -0.048 0.071 0.064 0.025 -0.035
0.007 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.633 0.102 0.000 0.780 <.0001 0.102 0.015 0.028 0.400 0.233
ROA 0.266 -0.230 -0.131 -0.148 1.000 0.178 0.098 0.172 0.344 -0.001 0.358 -0.104 -0.302 0.063 0.033
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 0.981 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 0.030 0.265
BHAR 0.006 0.021 0.000 0.012 0.086 1.000 0.018 0.034 0.287 -0.314 0.385 0.118 -0.027 0.648 0.008
0.845 0.463 0.992 0.673 0.003 0.529 0.247 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.364 <.0001 0.787
CEO Age -0.103 -0.250 0.219 -0.046 0.089 -0.005 1.000 0.133 -0.025 0.127 -0.009 -0.088 -0.071 0.025 0.099
0.000 <.0001 <.0001 0.116 0.002 0.866 <.0001 0.390 <.0001 0.751 0.003 0.016 0.402 0.001
Firm Age -0.076 -0.033 -0.090 -0.096 0.118 0.015 0.154 1.000 -0.042 0.031 0.002 0.003 -0.119 -0.010 0.260
0.009 0.254 0.002 0.001 <.0001 0.620 <.0001 0.156 0.291 0.952 0.925 <.0001 0.738 <.0001
Size 0.278 0.107 -0.019 0.027 0.336 0.186 -0.039 -0.025 1.000 -0.468 0.830 -0.014 -0.135 0.124 -0.078
<.0001 0.000 0.522 0.360 <.0001 <.0001 0.178 0.398 <.0001 <.0001 0.640 <.0001 <.0001 0.008
BM -0.135 -0.260 -0.023 -0.080 -0.022 -0.179 0.057 0.019 -0.452 1.000 -0.523 -0.329 0.027 -0.157 -0.043
<.0001 <.0001 0.438 0.006 0.446 <.0001 0.050 0.519 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.363 <.0001 0.144
Price 0.166 0.106 -0.061 0.009 0.220 0.234 -0.069 -0.031 0.685 -0.292 1.000 0.013 -0.068 0.155 -0.001
<.0001 0.000 0.038 0.759 <.0001 <.0001 0.018 0.296 <.0001 <.0001 0.661 0.020 <.0001 0.982
CFI -0.009 0.217 0.012 0.074 -0.077 0.092 -0.041 0.039 0.110 -0.361 0.093 1.000 -0.292 0.029 0.029
0.771 <.0001 0.694 0.012 0.009 0.002 0.159 0.187 0.000 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 0.325 0.326
CFF -0.060 -0.020 -0.006 -0.006 -0.201 -0.085 -0.055 -0.101 -0.249 0.248 -0.127 -0.619 1.000 0.026 0.052
0.039 0.497 0.834 0.839 <.0001 0.004 0.061 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.370 0.077
Momen 0.031 0.063 0.003 0.038 0.025 0.586 0.026 0.001 0.093 -0.131 0.089 0.063 -0.028 1.000 0.000
0.292 0.031 0.922 0.189 0.388 <.0001 0.384 0.968 0.002 <.0001 0.002 0.031 0.334 0.997
Tenure -0.006 0.127 -0.179 -0.060 0.029 -0.007 0.141 0.219 -0.113 0.058 -0.034 -0.053 0.077 -0.006 1.000
0.837 <.0001 <.0001 0.040 0.324 0.824 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 0.049 0.249 0.068 0.009 0.835
TABLE 3
N = 1,169
Spearman and Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Spearman correlation coefficients are presented above the diagonal ans Pearson below. A total of 1,169 firm year observations are presented representing 300 companies and 379 CEOs. All correlations 
significant at 0.10 or less are shown in bold. 
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Hypothesis 1 Results 
Serial versus non-serial CEO analysis 
Hypothesis 1 states that there will be no difference between the CEO ability (MA-Score) of 
serial CEOs and non-serial CEOs. Table 5 presents two-sample t-tests for management quality 
and firm performance for serial versus non-serial CEOs. Of the 379 CEOs in my final sample, 
179 are serial CEOs and  200 are not. Of the 300 distinct companies, 157 had serial CEOs during 
the sample period and 143 did not.  
Serial CEO quality has been associated with higher compensation (Gudell 2011) but there 
has been no comparison of serial CEOs to non-serial CEOs in terms of a managerial ability 
score. This dissertation finds that the mean difference of -0.028 is statistically significant with a 
t-statistic of -3.19 (p<0.01) (see Table 5) and a median difference of -0.019 is statistically 
significant with a z-statistic of -3.26 (p<0.01). This negative relationship may be driven by the 
performance of the previous CEO or by first-year CEOs overstating current expenses to inflate 
performance in the future (Strong and Meyer 1987; Elliott and Shaw 1988; DeAngelo, 1988; 
Pourciau, 1993).  
ROA (Table 5) for serial CEOs does not fare as well as the non-serial CEOs. The mean 
difference of -0.059 for ROA is significant with a t-statistic of -4.45 (p<0.01). The median 
difference is -0.049 with a z-statistic of -5.76 (p<0.01). This evidence is supported by prior 
literature. Many serial CEOs are brought in to help distressed companies or improve firm 
performance (Gudell 2011). There is also evidence that ROA improves over time with serial 
CEO tenure. This will be discussed in more detail later in the study.  
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Table 4 – Non-Venture Backed vs. Venture Backed Univariate Tests
 
N Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th N Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th
Diff in 
Means
Diff in 
Medians
(t-stat) (z-stat)
MA-Score 664 0.023 0.158 -0.069 -0.002 0.068 505 -0.002 0.142 -0.085 -0.038 0.031 0.025 0.036
(2.86) *** (4.14) ***
ROA 664 -0.116 0.224 -0.206 -0.057 0.031 505 -0.013 0.204 -0.032 0.029 0.075 -0.103 -0.087
(-8.16) *** (-10.49) ***
CEO Age 664 54 7 49 54 59 505 58 8 53 58 63 -3.944 -4.000
(-8.75) *** (-8.13) ***
Firm Age 664 2.7 0.4 2.4 2.6 2.8 505 2.7 0.8 2.2 2.7 3.4 -0.042 -0.069
(-1.05) (-0.14)
Size (MVE) 664 6.6 1.4 5.6 6.5 7.4 505 6.2 1.7 5.1 6.5 7.5 0.331 0.042
(3.54) *** (1.83) *
∆MA_Score 478 -0.007 0.117 -0.059 -0.005 0.050 387 -0.005 0.110 -0.057 -0.005 0.048 -0.002 0.000
(-0.31) (0.15)
∆ROA 477 -0.014 0.165 -0.062 -0.007 0.041 383 -0.009 0.205 -0.038 -0.002 0.025 -0.005 -0.005
(-0.42) (-0.86)
GRAS 472 0.241 0.450 -0.026 0.136 0.331 378 0.159 0.407 -0.043 0.047 0.228 0.082 0.089
(2.78) *** (3.71) ***
Total CEOs 227 152
Total companies 180 120
This table (Panel A )represents the mean comparison of venture backed companies versus non-venture backed companies. Firm Age and market value of equity (MVE) 
are reported in natural log form. Significance at *10%, **5%, and *** are presented in bold italics (two-tailed tests).
TABLE 4
Non-Venture Backed versus Venture Backed Univariate Tests
Venture Backed firms Non-Venture Backed firms
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Hypothesis 1 states that there will be no difference between the management quality (MA-
Score) of serial CEOs and non-serial CEOs. These findings provide evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis (H2A). In other words, there is a significant difference between the managerial ability 
of serial CEOs versus non-serial CEOs.  
Although I did not hypothesis about the differences of venture backed CEOs versus non-
venture backed CEOs, I do find similar results to the Chemmanur et al. (2014) study. I find a 
significant difference between the managerial ability (MA-Score) of venture-backed companies 
and non-venture backed companies. Venture backed companies have a mean MA-Score of 0.023 
while non-venture backed companies have a mean MA-Score of -0.002. The mean difference of 
0.025 is statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2.86 (p<0.01). The difference in medians of 
0.036 is also positive and significant with a z-statistic of 4.41 (p<0.01). These findings provide 
support for the Chemmanur et al. (2014) study.  
 An interesting finding is that ROA for venture backed companies is, on average, lower 
than for non-venture backed companies.  The mean difference of -0.103 is statistically significant 
with a t-statistic of -8.16 (p<0.01). The difference in medians of -0.087 is also negative and 
significant with a z-statistic of -10.49 (p<0.01). These findings for the MA-Score and ROA 
variables are an indication that venture capitalists do hire talented CEOs, although their focus 
may not be profitability.  
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Table 5 - Serial versus. Non-Serial CEOs Univariate Tests 
 
N Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th N Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th
Diff in 
Means
Diff in 
Medians
(t-stat) (z-stat)
MA-Score 523 -0.003 0.141 -0.087 -0.030 0.034 646 0.025 0.159 -0.071 -0.011 0.073 -0.028 -0.019
(-3.19) *** (-3.26) ***
ROA 523 -0.104 0.239 -0.171 -0.034 0.036 646 -0.045 0.203 -0.102 0.016 0.065 -0.059 -0.049
(-4.45) *** (-5.76) ***
CEO Age 523 58 8 52 58 63 646 54 7 50 55 59 3.440 3.000
(7.57) *** (7.24) ***
Firm Age 523 2.6 0.6 2.3 2.6 2.8 646 2.8 0.6 2.4 2.8 3.1 -0.114 -0.208
(-3.11) *** (-4.77) ***
Size (MVE) 523 6.4 1.5 5.4 6.5 7.5 646 6.5 1.6 5.6 6.6 7.5 -0.058 -0.120
(-0.64) (-0.81)
∆MA_Score 382 -0.008 0.107 -0.057 -0.006 0.050 483 -0.005 0.119 -0.059 -0.005 0.048 -0.003 0.000
(-0.39) 0.00
∆ROA 379 -0.011 0.224 -0.049 -0.001 0.033 481 -0.013 0.144 -0.056 -0.007 0.030 0.003 0.007
(0.2) (0.89)
GRAS 374 0.194 0.428 -0.040 0.090 0.266 476 0.213 0.438 -0.032 0.094 0.309 -0.019 -0.005
(-0.63) (-0.54)
Total CEOs 179 200
Total companies 157 143
This table (Panel B) represents the mean comparison of serial CEOs versus non-serial CEOs. Firm Age and market value of equity (MVE) are reported in natural log 
form. Significance at *10%, **5%, and *** are presented in bold italics (two-tailed tests).
TABLE 5
Serial versus Non-Serial CEOs Univariate Tests
Serial CEOs Non-Serial CEOs
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Hypothesis 2 Results 
Recycle versus non-recycle CEOs analysis 
Hypothesis 2 states that there will be no difference between the CEO ability (MA-Score) of 
recycled CEOs (Recycle) and non-recycled CEOs. Recycled CEOs are the serial CEOs of 
venture backed companies. Table 6 presents two-sample t-tests for management quality and firm 
performance for recycle CEOs versus non-recycle CEOs. To have a better comparison of recycle 
CEOs to non-recycle CEOs, the dataset was reduced to include only serial CEOs. This reduction 
leaves  a dataset of 183 total CEOs and 160 companies. Of the 179 CEOs, 59 are recycle CEOs 
and 120 are not. Of the 157 companies, 52 have recycle CEOs and 105 do not. For a list of the 
recycled CEOs in this study, see Appendices D and E. 
This analysis finds that the MA-Score mean difference between recycled CEOs and non-
recycled CEOs (0.066) is statistically significant with a t-statistic of 4.32 (p<0.01) and a median 
difference of 0.051 which is statistically significant with a z-statistic of 5.19 (p<0.01). See Table 
6 for results. 
The ROA for recycled CEOs does not fare as well as for non-recycle CEOs (Table 6). The 
mean difference of -0.074 for ROA is significant with a t-statistic of -3.30 (p<0.01). The median 
difference is -0.096 with a z-statistic of -5.11 (p<0.01). Recycle CEOs are a special type of serial 
CEO and the findings are similar to the ROA findings for serial CEOs (shown in Panel B). Both 
relationships are negative and significant for ROA. However, the findings for MA-Score are 
different. Serial CEOs have a significant and negative relationship to managerial ability but 
Recycle CEOs have a positive relationship. This positive relationship may be driven by the 
influence of venture capitalists.  
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Although there is very little prior literature on recycled CEOs, De Carvalho et al.’s (2008) 
survey of venture capitalists surmise that CEOs are an integral part of company success. This 
result provides support for their assertions. Also, the positive associations (as predicted) provide 
empirical evidence that this unique type of CEO (recycled) is of high ability and most likely a 
significant part of venture capital success.  
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Table 6 - Recycled versus Non-Recycled CEOs Univariate Tests 
  
N Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th N Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th
Diff in 
Means
Diff in 
Medians
(t-stat) (z-stat)
MA-Score 152 0.043 0.171 -0.048 0.008 0.075 371 -0.022 0.121 -0.098 -0.043 0.014 0.066 0.051
(4.32) *** (5.19) ***
ROA 152 -0.157 0.231 -0.229 -0.097 -0.013 371 -0.082 0.239 -0.151 -0.001 0.044 -0.074 -0.096
(-3.30) *** (-5.11) ***
CEO Age 152 55 7 50 54 60 371 59 8 54 59 64 -3.992 -5.000
(-5.72) *** (-5.32) ***
Firm Age 152 2.6 0.4 2.3 2.5 2.8 371 2.7 0.7 2.3 2.6 2.9 -0.132 -0.154
(-2.81) *** (-1.43)
Size (MVE) 152 6.5 1.5 5.5 6.3 7.6 371 6.3 1.5 5.4 6.5 7.5 0.195 -0.249
(1.35) (0.16)
∆MA_Score 106 -0.020 0.128 -0.057 -0.002 0.051 276 -0.003 0.098 -0.057 -0.008 0.050 -0.016 0.006
(-1.17) (-0.10)
∆ROA 106 -0.005 0.226 -0.054 -0.003 0.050 273 -0.013 0.224 -0.046 0.000 0.027 0.008 -0.003
(0.32) (0.39)
GRAS 105 0.297 0.537 0.001 0.121 0.347 269 0.154 0.370 -0.046 0.072 0.246 0.143 0.048
(2.50) ** (2.41) **
Total CEOs 59    120
Total companies 52    105
This table (Panel C) represents the mean comparison of recycled CEOs versus non-recycled CEOs. Firm Age and market value of equity (MVE) are reported in natural log 
form. Significance at *10%, **5%, and *** are presented in bold italics (two-tailed tests).
TABLE 6
Recycled versus Non-Recycled CEOs Univariate Tests
Recycled CEOs Non-Recycled CEOs
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Propensity Score Match Results 
 In addition to univariate tests, and ordinary least squares regressions, a propensity score 
matching analysis is performed to compare the management quality of recycled and non-recycled 
CEOs. It is possible that the ability to hire a talented CEO with industry specific skills is not 
entirely exogeneous and may depend on the characteristics of the recruiting company.  Thus, 
similar companies will be able to hire equally skilled CEOs whether or not they are recycled. 
Comparing firms that hire recycled CEO to similar firms that hire non-recycled CEOs may 
temper the effects of endogeneity. In other words, matching on the propensity of a company’s 
ability (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), in this case the ability to hire a talented CEO could help to 
reduce any comparison bias.  For this sample I run a logistic regression to match on ROA, firm 
size and firm age. See table 7 for the preliminary logistic procedure used for the propensity score 
match.  
Table 7 - Propensity Score Estimation 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.006 0.618 10.531 0.001
ROA -1.896 0.374 25.698 <.0001
Firm Size 0.157 0.063 6.222 0.013
Firm Age -0.418 0.153 7.479 0.006
Total CEOs 91
Total companies 90
This table represents the propensity-score matched variables to analyze recycled versus 
non-recycled CEOs.
TABLE 7
Logistic Procedure
Propensity Score Estimation
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The results of the propensity score match are shown in Table 8. There are a total of 52 
CEOs matched to 39 non-recycled CEOs for a total of 91. This propensity score match also 
represents 52 companies with recycled CEOs and 38 companies without recycled CEOs for a 
total of 90 companies. The results for the propensity score match are not significant (Table 8). 
The t-statistic for the MA-Score difference is only 0.56, and the z-statistic is -0.83. For this 
propensity -score matched analysis, the findings indicate that the CEOs of similar sized and aged 
companies with similar ROAs are not very different from each other, at least in terms of 
managerial ability. However, these results may be inclusive due to the lack of matching 
variables.  
A more detailed analysis can focus on IPO characteristics such as IPO firm headquarter 
dummies and measures of underwriter reputation. Also, pre-IPO characteristics such as total 
assets, and the use of an indicator variable for positive/negative earnings can provide information 
regarding the type of manager these matched companies can hire.  
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Table 8 - Propensity Score Matched Univariate Analysis, Recycled vs. Non-Recycled 
 
Hypothesis 3 Results 
 
Multivariable Results 
Hypothesis 3 states that venture backing will have a positive relationship with future 
CEO ability (MA-Score). Table 9 presents multivariable tests for management quality and the 
variable of interest venture backing (VB). 
 
Diff in 
Means
Diff in 
Medians
N Mean Median N Mean Median
(
stat) (z-stat)
MA-Score 52 0.061 -0.003 51 0.037 -0.005 0.02 0.00
(0.56) (-0.83)
∆MA_Score 7 0.007 0.029 33 0.017 0.002 -0.01 0.03
(-0.31) (0.61)
GRAS 6 0.114 -0.037 33 0.254 0.086 -0.14 -0.12
(-0.69) (-0.56)
Total CEOs 52 39
Total companies 52 38
This table represents the outcome of the propensity score matched sample. A two sample t-test and 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is performed on the medians. Results are shown at *10%, **5%, and 
***1% statistical significance (two-tailed tests).
Recycled CEOs Non-recycled CEOs
TABLE 8
Propensity Score Matched Univariate Analysis, Recycled vs. Non-Recycled
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Table 9 - The Relationship of Venture Backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOs to Future Managerial Ability 
 
 
 
 
Future MA-Score by IPO-Year Future MA-Score by IPO-Year
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
Dependent variable: MA-Scoret+1 MA-Scoret+1 MA-Scoret+1 MA-Scoret+1 Dependent variable: MA-Scoret+3 MA-Scoret+3 MA-Scoret+3 MA-Scoret+3
Intercept -0.117 -0.142 -0.146 -0.128 Intercept -0.230 -0.169 -0.191 -0.229
(-1.38) * (-1.76) ** (-1.81) ** (-1.52) * (-2.09) ** (-1.58) * (-1.79) ** (-2.12) **
VB + -0.014 -0.024 VB 0.044 0.035
(-0.79) (-1.28) (1.90) ** (1.44) *
Serial +/- -0.020 -0.038 ** Serial -0.031 -0.061
(-1.13) (-1.91) (-1.31) * (-2.29) **
Recycle +/- 0.032 0.067 Recycle 0.045 0.065
(1.33) * (2.37) *** (1.44) * (1.75) **
CEO Age + -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 CEO Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(-1.07) (-0.54) (-0.92) (-0.62) (0.19) (0.10) (-0.26) (0.87)
Firm Age - -0.013 -0.015 -0.011 -0.012 LnAge -0.018 -0.025 -0.015 -0.026
(-0.97) (-1.09) (-0.80) (-0.91) (-0.98) (-1.32) * (-0.82) (-1.39) *
Size (MVE) + 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 LnSize(MVE) 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.036
(5.75) *** (5.71) *** (5.73) *** (5.72) *** (4.18) *** (4.24) *** (4.26) *** (4.02) ***
Adj R2 0.107 0.109 0.111 0.122 Adj R2 0.119 0.108 0.110 0.142
No. of Observations              280 280            280            280            No. of Observations              151 151            151            151            
This table presents results for an IPO-year only sample for one- and three-years ahead information. This table represents 300 distince companies and 300 firm years. See appendix A for all other 
variable definitions. The market value of equity (MVE) and Firm Age are reported in natural log form. Significance at *10%, **5%, and ***1% are presented in bold italics (one-tailed tests).
The Relationship of  of Venture Backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOs on Future Managerial Ability
TABLE 9
One-Year Ahead Three-Years Ahead
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The regression results displayed in Table 9, column 1, indicate that venture backing has no 
effect on one-year ahead managerial ability (MA-Scoret+1). The results for Model 1 shown in 
Panel A indicate that ownership structure, or rather venture backing, has no effect on one-year 
ahead managerial ability score. An interesting outcome, however, is that CEO Age (although not 
significant) has a negative association to one-year ahead MA-Score and not positive as expected. 
The sign is negative in the full model as well, which includes recycled CEOs. This significance 
will be discussed later in more detail.  
Although there is no support for Hypothesis 3 for the one-year ahead MA-Score, when three-
years ahead managerial ability is considered (Table 9), there is support. For the three-years ahead 
MA-Score, there is a positive and significant relationship between venture backing and future 
MA-Score (t statistic = 1.90, p<0.05). 
Hypothesis 4 Results 
 
Multivariable Results 
Hypothesis 4 states that serial CEOs will have a positive relationship with future CEO 
ability. The regression results displayed in Table 9 (model 2) show no significance for one-year 
post IPO, but there is significance for 3-years post IPO (-1.31, p<.10). These results indicate that  
serial CEOs will have a significantly negative relationship with three-years post IPO MA-Score 
when compared to their non-serial CEO counterparts. These results indicate that serial CEOs are 
not necessarily focused on turning resources in revenues but more likely in profitability. As 
stated earlier, serial CEOs are often brought in to help distressed companies (Gudell 2011), or 
new CEOs may overstate expenses in an effort to make their future performance seem better 
(Strong and Meyer 1987; Elliott and Shaw 1988; DeAngelo, 1988; Pourciau, 1993). Kroll, 
Walters, and Le (2007) argue that outside top management may not be as valuable to young 
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firms that have recently gone public because they do not have tacit knowledge of the firms or 
entrepreneurial vision. Serial CEOs tend to be outsiders, so this may also explain the negative 
results.  
Hypothesis 5 Results 
 
Multivariable Results 
Hypothesis 5 states that recycled CEOs will have a positive relationship with future CEO 
ability. The regression results displayed in Table 9 (model 3) indicate a positive relationship with 
one- and three-year ahead managerial ability. Therefore, I provide empirical evidence that 
recycled CEOs have a significantly positive effect on one-year (t-stat = 1.33, p<0.10) and three-
years ahead MA-Score (t-stat =1.44, p<0.10) as compared to their non-recycled CEO 
counterparts. 
For the full model (model 4), the relationship remains positive. As stated earlier, recycled 
CEOs are a type of serial CEO and serial CEOs are often brought in to help distressed companies 
(Gudell 2011). However, a recycled CEO may be brought in to assist a company through the 
growth stages. This positive effect would make sense for a venture backed company, especially 
one that seeks management from other venture backed companies.  
Hypothesis 6 Results 
 
Multivariable Results 
Hypothesis 6 states that recycled CEOs will have an incremental effect on future CEO 
ability. The regression results displayed in Table 9 (model 4) indicate a positive and significant  
relationship with one-year and three-years ahead managerial ability. Therefore, recycled CEOs 
provide incremental benefit to managerial ability over and above venture backing and serial 
CEOs. For the one-year ahead relationship of recycled CEOs with managerial ability the 
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coefficient is significant and positive (t-statistic = 2.37, p<0.01) and for three years ahead 
managerial ability the effect of recycled CEOs is still positive and significant (t-statistic = 1.75, 
p<0.05). The significant, negative relationship between serial CEOs and managerial ability still 
remains in the full model (model 4). The coefficients for the serial CEOs for one- and three-years 
ahead are significant with t-statistics = 1.91 (p<0.05) and t-statistic = -2.29 (p<0.05) respectively. 
The results of the propensity score-matched dataset is presented in Table 10. Results are 
similar to those reported in Table 9 (IPO-year database) for the managerial ability score for one-
year post-IPO. The relationship between serial and MA-score one-year ahead is negative and 
significant (t-statistic=-2.57, p<0.01). The relationship between recycle and MA-score one-year 
ahead is also similar to the results in Table 9. Here, the relationship is positive and significant (t-
statistic=2.52, p<0.01). See Table 10 below for details.  
  
  
 
63 
Table 10 - The Relationship of Venture Backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOs to Future Managerial Ability 
  
Future MA-Score by Matched CEOs Future MA-Score by Matched CEOs
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
Dependent variable: MA-Scoret+1 MA-Scoret+1 MA-Scoret+1 MA-Scoret+1 Dependent variable: MA-Scoret+3 MA-Scoret+3 MA-Scoret+3 MA-Scoret+3
Intercept -0.454 -0.469 -0.465 -0.524 Intercept -0.870 -0.870 -0.870 -0.870
-1.79 ** -1.92 ** -1.9 ** -2.13 ** -2.81 *** -3.02 *** -3.02 *** -2.75 ***
VB + -0.014 -0.008 VB 0.001 0.000
-0.17 -0.1 0.01 (0.00)
Serial +/- -0.028 -0.369 Serial 0.001 0.001
-0.62 -2.57 *** 0.02 0.02
Recycle +/- 0.006 0.352 Recycle 0.001 0.00
0.13 2.51 *** 0.02 (0.00)
CEO Age + 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 CEO Age 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
-0.01 0.2 -0.07 0.19 2.45 ** 2.35 * 2.35 * 2.3 *
LnAge - 0.025 0.020 0.029 0.023 LnAge 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
0.47 0.38 0.54 0.44 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
LnSize(MVE) + 0.069 0.070 0.069 0.079 LnSize(MVE) 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087
4.51 *** 4.67 *** 4.6 *** 5.18 *** 4.27 *** 4.29 *** 4.29 *** 4.19 ***
Adj R2 0.274 0.279 0.273 0.334 Adj R2 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.304
No. of Observations                     57 57              57              57              No. of Observations                34 34              34              34              
One-Year Ahead Three-Years Ahead
TABLE 10
The Relationship of Venture Backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOs to Future Managerial Ability
This table presents results for the propensity score matched dataset for one- and three-years ahead information. This table represents 300 distince companies and 300 firm years. See appendix A for 
all other variable definitions. The market value of equity (MVE) and Firm Age are reported in natural log form. Significance at *10%, **5%, and ***1% are presented in bold italics (one-tailed tests).
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Hypothesis 7 Results 
Multivariable Results 
 Next, the association between recycled CEOs (RECYCLE) and future ROA is examined.  
Hypothesis 7 states that recycled CEOs will have an incremental effect on the change in future 
firm profitability (ChgROAt+1, t+3). The regression results displayed in Table 11 and Table 12 are 
for non-industry adjusted one-year ahead and three-years ahead change in ROA. Panel A shows 
results using the IPO-year dataset and panel B shows results using the propensity score-matched 
dataset. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to control for cross-sectional correlation 
and intertemporal correlation.  
For the variable of interest Recycle, there is no significance for the IPO-year dataset for 
both one- and three-year post-IPO results. This could be explained by the fact that many serial 
CEOs are hired by companies in distress, in other words, low ROA (Gudell 2011; Parrino 1997). 
This outcome could mean that recycled CEOs are brought in to focus on revenue, (transforming 
resources into revenue) for the companies they are hired to lead. 
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Table 11 - The Relationship of Venture Backing, Serial CEOs and Recycle CEOs to the Change in Future ROA 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
DV: ChgROAt+1 ChgROAt+1 ChgROAt+1 ChgROAt+1 ChgROAt+1 DV: ChgROAt+3 ChgROAt+3 ChgROAt+3 ChgROAt+3 ChgROAt+3
Intercept 0.021 -0.031 -0.023 0.025 0.024 Intercept -0.162 -0.148 -0.164 -0.13 -0.137
(0.30) (-0.83) (-0.59) (0.365) (0.35) (-1.18) (-0.83) (-1.13) (-0.77) -0.79
VB -0.041 -0.034 -0.034 VB -0.004 0.004 0.001
(-1.27) (-1.12) (-1.12) (-0.09) 0.10 0.01
Serial -0.002 0.015 0.015 Serial 0.030 0.046 0.050
(-0.10) (0.66) (0.67) (0.51) (0.67) (0.71)
Recycle -0.045 -0.039 -0.039 Recycle -0.012 -0.044 -0.051
(-1.04) (-0.84) (-0.91) (-0.29) (-0.86) (-0.95)
MA-Score 0.004 MA-Score 0.047
(0.13) (1.60)
CEO_Aget -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 CEO_Aget 0.002 0.002 -0.619 0.001 0.001
(-0.61) (-0.12) (-0.18) (-0.80) (-0.79) (0.84) (0.45) (0.82) (0.35) (0.37)
ROAt -0.116 -0.089 -0.096 -0.109 -0.110 ROAt -0.618 -0.596 0.002 -0.595 -0.602
(-2.94) *** (-2.47) *** (-2.71) *** (-2.70) *** (-2.44) *** (-14.28) *** (-8.87) *** (-15.52) *** (-7.06) *** (-7.58) ***
∆ROA 0.838 0.861 0.859 0.845 0.845 ∆ROA 0.259 0.277 0.258 0.277 0.273
(30.77) *** (20.66) *** (22.18) *** (27.29) *** (26.03) *** (4.17) *** (3.39) *** (4.59) *** (3.00) *** (3.12) ***
R2 0.643 0.637 0.641 0.645 0.645 R2 0.637 0.639 0.637 0.641 0.642
No. of Observations 244 244 244 244 244 No. of Observations 100 100 100 100 100
This table presents results for an IPO-year only dataset for one- and three-years ahead information. This table represents 300 distinct companies and 300 firm years. See appendix A for all other variable definitions. 
The market value of equity (MVE) and Firm Age are reported in natural log form. Significance at *10%, **5%, and ***1% are presented in bold italics (one-tailed tests).
IPO Year Dataset
 Unadjusted, One-year ahead  Unadjusted, Three-years ahead
TABLE 11
The Relationship of Venture backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOs to the Change in Future ROA - Unadjusted, One and Three years ahead
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Table 12 - The Relationship between Venture Backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOS to the Change in Future ROA – Non-
Industry Adjusted 
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
DV: ChgROAt+1 ChgROAt+1 ChgROAt+1 ChgROAt+1 ChgROAt+1 DV: ChgROAt+3 ChgROAt+3 ChgROAt+3 ChgROAt+3 ChgROAt+3
Intercept 0.096 0.063 0.067 0.090 0.101 Intercept -0.025 -0.016 -0.030 -0.009 0.024
(0.78) (0.90) (0.74) (0.77) (0.53) (-0.11) (-0.12) (-0.25) (-0.04) (0.06)
VB -0.023 0.008 0.010 VB 0.002 -0.008 -0.021
(-0.74) (0.23) (0.29) (0.03) (-0.15) (-0.17)
Serial 0.001 0.068 0.067 Serial 0.029 0.019 0.005
(0.01) (1.53) (1.48) (1.06) (0.44) (0.09)
Recycle -0.028 -0.080 -0.079 Recycle 0.025 0.012 0.027
(-0.92) (-2.79) ** (-3.29) ** (2.22) * (0.54) (0.30)
MA-Score -0.022 MA-Score -0.029
(-0.14) (-0.15)
CEO Aget -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 CEO Aget 0.000 -0.001 -0.294 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.13) (-1.56) * (-1.13) (-1.28) (-0.85) (-0.05) (-0.22) (-1.12) (-0.17) (-0.17)
ROAt 0.086 0.093 0.083 0.067 0.075 ROAt -0.304 -0.299 0.000 -0.299 -0.292
(0.31) (0.33) (0.30) (0.24) (0.24) (-1.15) (-1.13) (-0.11) (-1.13) (-0.92)
∆ROA 0.840 0.838 0.831 0.836 0.840 ∆ROA 0.196 0.207 0.206 0.207 0.210
(4.22) *** (4.16) *** (4.27) *** (3.94) ** (3.72) ** (1.24) (1.29) (1.34) (1.24) (1.11)
R2 0.490 0.488 0.494 0.503 0.503 R2 0.229 0.236 0.235 0.236 0.237
No. of Observations 70 70 70 70 70 No. of Observations 27 27 27 27 27
This table presents results for the propensity score-matche dataset for one- and three-years ahead information. This table represents 300 distinct companies and 300 firm years. See appendix A for all other variable 
definitions. The market value of equity (MVE) and Firm Age are reported in natural log form. Significance at *10%, **5%, and ***1% are presented in bold italics (one-tailed tests).
TABLE 12
The Relationship of Venture backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOs to the Change in Future ROA - Unadjusted, One and Three years ahead
Propensity Score Match Dataset
 Unadjusted, One-year ahead  Unadjusted, Three-years ahead
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The industry adjusted analysis is shown in Tables 13 and 14. The IPO-year dataset is shown in 
Table 13 and the propensity score-matched dataset is shown in Table 14. For industry adjusted 
change in ROA for one-year post IPO (propensity score-matched dataset), recycled CEOs have a 
negative and significant relationship with future change in ROA (t-statistic=-2.40 (p<0.05). 
Although the relationship is significant, the direction is negative instead of positive. This could 
be explained by an earlier finding in this dissertation in that recycled CEOs have a positive 
relationship to future managerial ability or in the ability to turn resources into revenue. This 
finding provides further evidence that recycled CEOs are more focused on revenue than 
profitability.  
In the same model, serial CEOs have a positive and significant relationship to one-year 
post IPO ROA. This finding is supported by prior research in that serial CEOs tend to be brought 
in to improve distressed companies (Gudell 2011; Parrino 1997). Here also, standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year to control for cross-sectional correlation and intertemporal correlation. 
For details see Tables 13 and 14 below.  
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Table 13 - The Relationship of Venture Backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOs to the Change in Future ROA - Industry Adjusted 
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
DV: IaChgROAt+1 IaChgROAt+1 IaChgROAt+1 IaChgROAt+1 IaChgROAt+1 DV: IaChgROAt+3 IaChgROAt+3 IaChgROAt+3 IaChgROAt+3 IaChgROAt+3
Intercept 0.044 -0.003 0.009 0.045 0.040 Intercept -0.157 -0.049 -0.071 -0.121 -0.144
(0.61) (-0.07) (0.19) (0.64) (0.56) (-1.25) (-0.30) (-0.53) (-0.85) (-0.95)
VB -0.032 -0.024 -0.025 VB 0.056 0.068 0.060
(-1.05) (-0.86) (-0.87) (1.38) (1.78) * (1.39)
Serial -0.008 0.010 0.011 Serial 0.034 0.051 0.060
(-0.38) (0.52) (0.59) (0.51) (0.76) (0.89)
Recycle -0.046 -0.040 -0.044 Recycle 0.001 -0.068 -0.088
(-0.97) (-0.85) (-0.99) (0.02) (-1.43) (-1.57)
MA-Score 0.032 MA-Score 0.128
(1.36) (5.80) ***
CEO_Aget -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 CEO_Aget 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-0.63) (-0.13) (-0.35) (-0.74) (-0.66) (0.90) (0.14) (0.44) (0.37) (-0.47)
ROAt -0.146 -0.144 -0.143 -0.141 -0.150 ROAt -0.582 -0.553 -0.579 -0.556 -0.591
(-4.11) *** (-3.52) *** (-3.34) *** (-3.69) *** (-4.01) *** (-8.72) *** (-4.22) ** (-6.42) *** (-4.61) *** (-5.88) ***
∆ROA 0.819 0.826 0.829 0.826 0.821 ∆ROA 0.259 0.275 0.253 0.279 0.251
(27.03) *** (21.28) *** (21.65) *** (25.14) *** (26.02) *** (3.57) ** (2.28) * (2.91) ** (2.43) ** (2.67) **
R2 0.640 0.636 0.640 0.643 0.643 R2 0.631 0.625 0.621 0.639 0.645
No. of Observations 244 244 244 244 244 No. of Observations 100 100 100 100 100
This table presents results for an IPO-year only dataset for one- and three-years ahead information. This table represents 300 distinct companies and 300 firm years. See appendix A for all other variable definitions. The 
market value of equity (MVE) and Firm Age are reported in natural log form. Significance at *10%, **5%, and ***1% are presented in bold italics (one-tailed tests).
TABLE 13
The Relationship of Venture backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOs to the Change in Future ROA - Industry Adjusted, One and Three years ahead
IPO Year Dataset
 Industry adjusted, One-year ahead  Industry adjusted, Three-years ahead
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Table 14 - The Relationship of Venture Backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOs to the Change in Future ROA - Industry Adjusted 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
DV: IaChgROAt+1 IaChgROAt+1 IaChgROAt+1 IaChgROAt+1 IaChgROAt+1 DV: IaChgROAt+3 IaChgROAt+3 IaChgROAt+3 IaChgROAt+3 IaChgROAt+3
Intercept 0.112 0.078 0.084 0.102 0.089 Intercept -0.036 0.012 0.021 -0.090 -0.092
(0.92) (2.01) (1.27) (0.90) (0.45) (-0.23) (0.32) (0.39) (-0.73) (-0.31)
VB -0.024 0.021 0.019 VB 0.033 0.107 0.108
(-0.47) (0.57) (0.57) (0.38) (1.49) (1.45)
Serial 0.002 0.090 0.090 Serial -0.014 0.085 0.085
(0.04) (1.67) * (1.64) * (-1.75) (0.77) (1.40)
Recycle -0.035 -0.108 -0.108 Recycle -0.013 -0.109 -0.110
(-0.86) (-2.24) ** (-2.40) ** (-0.43) (-0.82) (-1.50)
MA-Score 0.0258 MA-Score 0.002
(0.17) (0.01)
CEO_Aget -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 CEO_Aget 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.13) (-1.61) (-1.31) (-1.18) (-0.68) (0.10) (0.01) (-0.11) (0.04) (0.03)
ROAt -0.081 -0.077 -0.075 -0.075 -0.088 ROAt -0.293 -0.308 -0.306 -0.259 -0.260
(-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.28) (-0.28) (-0.27) (-1.55) (-1.48) (-1.49) (-1.01) (-0.73)
∆ROA (0.78) (0.77) (0.77) (0.78) (0.78) ∆ROA 0.245 0.237 0.239 0.251 0.250
(4.72) *** (4.76) *** (4.98) *** (4.37) *** (3.95) *** (2.69) * (2.44) * (2.57) * (2.28) * (1.58)
R2 0.486 0.484 0.492 0.508 0.509 R2 0.308 0.306 0.306 0.319 0.319
No. of Observations 70 70 70 70 70 No. of Observations 27 27 27 27 27
This table presents results for an propensity score-matched dataset for one- and three-years ahead information. This table represents 300 distinct companies and 300 firm years. See appendix A for all other variable 
definitions. The market value of equity (MVE) and Firm Age are reported in natural log form. Significance at *10%, **5%, and ***1% are presented in bold italics (one-tailed tests).
TABLE 14
The Relationship of Venture backing, Serial CEOs, and Recycle CEOs to the Change in Future ROA - Industry Adjusted, One and Three years ahead
Propensity Score Match Dataset
 Industry adjusted, One-year ahead  Industry adjusted, Three-years ahead
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Hypothesis 8 Results 
Multivariable Results 
Hypothesis 8 states that recycled CEOs will be positively associated with future buy-and-
hold adjusted returns (BHAR t+1, t+3). Although the base model shows some significance with 
control variables, the results show no significance with the main variable of interest, Recycle. 
This is most likely driven by the examination period of one- and three-years post IPO. 
Researchers who examine post IPO performance have used longer time periods and larger 
samples (Chemmanur et al. 2014) as well as more mature firms such as companies that have 
been through a leveraged buyout (Katz 2009). See Table 15 below for more detail. 
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Table 15 - One- and Three-Year Ahead Stock Return Analysis by Venture Backing and CEO ype
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
DV: BHAR t+1 BHAR t+1 BHAR t+1 BHAR t+3 BHAR t+3
Intercept 0.090 0.137 0.089 0.227 0.680
(1.05) (1.24) (0.67) (0.75) (1.62) *
VB -0.083 -0.049 -0.139 -0.424
(-0.90) (-0.46) (-0.51) (-1.27)
Serial -0.033 0.001 0.198 0.265
(-0.37) (0.01) (0.79) (0.88)
Recycle 0.141 0.171 -0.170 -0.353
(0.91) (0.86) (-0.29) (-0.35)
MA-Score 0.001 0.142 -0.091 0.094
(0.00) (0.37) (-0.09) (0.08)
BETA -0.086 -0.086 -0.076 -0.008 -0.140
(-1.57) * (-1.54) * (-1.18) (-0.05) (-0.72)
BM 0.063 * 0.053 0.089 -0.174 -0.441
(1.43) (1.14) (1.62) * (-1.15) (-1.76) **
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (-0.95) (-1.18) (-0.85)
Momentum 1.020 1.044 1.756 1.558 2.040
(1.51) * (1.53) * (2.18) ** (0.78) (0.78)
ChgWC 0.001 -0.002
(1.46) * (-0.42)
ChgNCO 0.000 -0.002
(0.46) (-1.33) *
ChgFIN 0.000 -0.001
(0.30) (-0.56)
CAPX 0.095 0.355
(0.85) (0.65)
CFO -0.021 0.209
(-1.15) (1.56) *
CFI -0.015 0.216
(-0.06) (0.24)
CFF -0.416 0.890
(-1.52) * (0.97)
Adj R2 0.008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.081 -0.139
No. of Observations 283 283 283 63 59
TABLE 15
One-year and Three-year Ahead Stock Return Analysis by Venture Backing and CEO Type
This table  presents results for IPO-year  dataset for one- and three-years ahead information. This table 
represents 300 distinct companies and 300 firm years. See appendix A for all other variable definitions. 
Significance at *10%, **5%, and ***1% are presented in bold italics (one-tailed tests).
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Supplemental Tests 
For a directional analysis of CEO experience, a distinction was made between the past and 
present structure of the CEO’s organizational backing. For instance, I examined four types of 
paths to current employment of the CEOs in my sample. The four CEO experience paths of 
interest are venture backed to venture backed (VB_VB), venture backed to non-venture backed 
(VB_NVB), non-venture backed to venture backed (NVB_VB), and non-venture backed to non-
venture backed (NVB_NVB). The intent is to see if the type of prior experience has any 
influence or relationship to managerial ability or firm performance. A regression analysis was 
performed using three of the four categories discussed above. If the path of a serial CEO was VB 
to VB that CEO was coded 1 (0 otherwise). If the path of a serial CEO was VB to NVB that 
CEO was coded 1 (0 otherwise). If the path of a serial CEO was NVB to VB that CEO was 
coded 1 (0 otherwise) and if the path of a serial CEO was NVB to NVB that CEO was coded 1 (0 
otherwise).  The dummy variables used in the regression were for VB_VB, VB_NVB, and 
NVB_VB. The results for NVB_NVB will be captured in the intercept. The dependent variables 
are MA-Score one and three-years post IPO, as well as the change in ROA, one and three-years 
post IPO. 
Results shown in Table 16 show no significance for one-year ahead MA-Score. However, for 
three-years post IPO, the path of VB_VB has a significant and positive association with 
managerial ability (t-statistic=1.97, p<0.05). I also included a model with the control variables, 
CEO age, firm age, and firm size. The results are similar with VB_VB still having a significant 
and positive relationship with three years post IPO managerial ability (t-statistic=1.95, p<0.10). 
This analysis provides more evidence of the importance of recycled CEOs. 
 73 
 
A similar analysis was done with the change in future ROA as the dependent variable. In line 
with earlier analysis presented in this dissertation, the association between recycled CEOs 
(VB_VB) are also negative and significant (t-statistic=-1.66, p<0.10). This significance does not 
hold for the change in ROA, three-years post IPO, but VB_NVB is significant and positive (t-
statistic=2.05, p<0.05). These results are for the regression that does not include the control 
variables of CEO age, ROA and change ROA. When the full model is analyzed, none of the 
variables of interest are significant. See Table 17 for these results.  
The results from this analysis offer further support that recycled CEOs (VB-VB) have a 
significant relationship to future firm performance when compared to other serial CEO types.  
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Table 16 - CEO Directional Experience Analysis – IPO-Year dataset 
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
DV: MA-Scoret+1 MA-Scoret+1 MA-Scoret+3 MA-Scoret+3
Intercept 0.000 -0.181 -0.024 -0.305
(-0.02) (-1.35) (-1.01) (-1.99) *
VB to VB 0.044 0.037 0.073 0.067
(1.46) (1.31) (1.97) ** (1.95) *
VB to NVB -0.086 -0.050 -0.116 0.001
(-1.17) (-0.74) (-0.82) (0.01)
NVB to VB -0.005 -0.001 -0.017 -0.008
(-0.13) (-0.04) (-0.29) (-0.15)
CeoAge -0.001 0.000
(-0.58) (-0.13)
Firm Age -0.009 -0.010
(-0.41) (-0.40)
Firm Size 0.040 0.050
(4.25) *** (3.73) ***
Adj R2 0.015 0.157 0.038 0.187
No. of Observations 109 109 66 66
This table analyzes the relationships between dummy variables representing prior 
employment to current employment of CEOs: venture backed to venture backed (VB to 
VB), venture backed to non-venture backed (VB to NVB), and non-venture backed to 
venture backed (NVB to VB). The intercept captures non-venture backed to non-venture 
backed (NVB to NVB). See appendix A for all other variable definitions. Significance at 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% are presented in bold italics. (two-tailed tests).
TABLE 16
CEO Directional Experience Analysis - IPO-year dataset
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Table 17 - CEO Directional Experience Analysis - Propensity Score-Matched Dataset 
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
DV: ChgROAt+1 ChgROAt+1 ChgROAt+3 ChgROAt+3
Intercept 0.014 0.146 -0.030 -0.120
(0.40) (1.19) (-0.98) (-0.82)
VB to VB -0.053 -0.067 0.044 -0.027
(-1.02) (-1.66) * (0.87) (-0.52)
VB to NVB 0.024 0.064 0.313 -0.051
(0.18) (0.62) (2.05) ** (-0.28)
NVB to VB -0.086 -0.085 0.033 -0.032
(-1.25) (-1.65) (0.41) (-0.42)
CeoAge -0.003 0.002
(-1.29) (0.75)
ROA -0.093 -0.491
(-0.81) (-2.81) ***
ChgROA 0.759 0.179
(6.88) *** (1.38)
Adj R2 -0.009 0.465 0.037 0.254
No. of Observations 93 93 43 43
This table analyzes the relationships between dummy variables representing prior employment 
to current employment of CEOs: venture backed to venture backed (VB to VB), venture backed 
to non-venture backed (VB to NVB), and non-venture backed to venture backed (NVB to VB). 
The intercept captures non-venture backed to non-venture backed (NVB to NVB). See 
appendix A for all other variable definitions. Significance at *10%, **5%, and ***1% are 
presented in bold italics. (two-tailed tests).
TABLE 17
CEO Directional Experience Analysis - Propensity score-matched dataset
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Logistic regression with binary dependent variable 
In this dissertation, I also use the binary variables as dependent variables to measure their 
relationships to managerial ability and ROA. A logistic regression was performed using venture 
backing as the binary dependent variable (Table 18, Panel A). Venture backed was coded as 1 
and non-venture backed was coded as 0. Results show that CEOs with venture backing are more 
likely to have a high managerial ability score.  
A logistic regression was performed using serial/non-serial CEOs as the binary dependent 
variable (Table 18, Panel B). Serial CEOs are coded as 1 and non-serial CEOs coded as 0. 
Results show that serial CEOs are more likely to have a lower managerial ability score than non-
serial CEOs. These results also support H1 in that the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
A logistic regression was performed using recycled/non-recycled CEOs as the binary 
dependent variable (Table 18, Panel C). Recycled CEOs are coded as 1 and non-recycled CEOs 
coded as 0. Results show that recycled CEOs are more likely to have a higher managerial ability 
score than non-recycled CEOs. These results also support H2 in that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. 
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Table 18 - Logistic Regression of Binary Dependent Variables: Venture Backed, Serial, and 
Recycled 
  
Panel A: Venture Backed vs. Non-Venture Backed
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 1.570 0.634 6.133 0.013
MA-Score 1.912 0.495 14.899 0.000
Serial 0.602 0.139 18.852 <.0001
ROA -3.613 0.408 78.265 <.0001
CEO Age -0.076 0.009 64.747 <.0001
Firm Age 0.261 0.104 6.264 0.012
Firm Size 0.277 0.048 33.106 <.0001
Firm Years VB - 664 NVB - 505
Panel B: Serial CEOs vs. Non-Serial CEOs
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -4.025 0.627 41.155 <.0001
MA-Score -0.954 0.451 4.465 0.035
VB 0.579 0.137 17.811 <.0001
ROA -1.025 0.330 9.632 0.002
CEO Age 0.077 0.009 76.392 <.0001
Firm Age -0.423 0.103 16.888 <.0001
Firm Size 0.038 0.045 0.724 0.395
Firm Years Serial CEOs - 523 Non-Serial CEOs - 646
Panel C: Recycled CEOs vs. Non-Recycled CEOs
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -1.567 0.894 3.076 0.080
MA-Score 1.707 0.541 9.975 0.002
ROA -2.098 0.385 29.662 <.0001
CEO Age -0.006 0.011 0.232 0.630
Firm Age -0.378 0.157 5.793 0.016
Firm Size 0.110 0.065 2.927 0.087
Firm Years Recycled CEOs - 152 Non-Recycled CEOs - 1017
Table 18
Logistic Regression of Binary Dependent Variables
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
This table presents the results of a logistic regression. The binary dependent variables are 
venture backed vs. non-venture backed (Panel A), serial ceo v. non-serial ceo Panel B), and 
recycled CEO vs. non-recycled CEO (Panel C) The dataset used is the IPO-year dataset. 
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Another logistic regression is also performed (Table 19, Panel A) using the managerial 
ability score as the dependent variable. The logistic dependent variable is High versus Low MA-
Score. To create a binary dependent variable, MA-Score was ranked from low to high and 
divided into terciles. The middle tercile was removed, and the highest level was coded 1. The 
lowest level was coded 0. Results show that CEOs with venture backing are more likely to have 
a high managerial ability score.  
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Table 19 - Logistic Regression of Binary Dependent: High MA-Score versus Low MA-Score 
 
  
Panel A
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -1.802 0.770 5.476 0.019
VB 0.604 0.161 14.117 0.000
CEO Age -0.022 0.010 4.449 0.035
Firm Age -0.037 0.118 0.097 0.756
Firm Size 0.420 0.057 54.240 <.0001
Panel B
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -0.888 0.716 1.537 0.215
Serial -0.428 0.158 7.391 0.007
CEO Age -0.027 0.010 6.931 0.009
Firm Age -0.080 0.119 0.453 0.501
Firm Size 0.422 0.056 56.397 <.0001
Panel C
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.282 0.799 8.149 0.004
VB 0.463 0.173 7.214 0.007
Serial -0.877 0.184 22.796 <.0001
Recycled 1.224 0.285 18.453 <.0001
CEO Age -0.010 0.011 0.769 0.381
Firm Age -0.037 0.122 0.092 0.762
Firm Size 0.434 0.059 54.016 <.0001
This table presents the results of a logistic regression. The binary dependent variables 
are high- vs. low-ma-score. Each panel varies by variable of interest: Panel A - VB; 
Panel B - Serial; and Panel C - VB, Serial, and Recycled.  
Table 19
Logistic Regression of Binary Dependent Variable
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
High MA-Score (1) versus Low MA-Score (0)
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Venture capitalists are known for providing financial support to entrepreneurs with new 
products, innovative ideas, and/or streamlined processes. Financial news sources constantly 
report on the companies supported by venture capitalists because many of these companies 
eventually seek funding through an initial public offering. Information on these private 
companies is sparse therefore, analysts and investors may use information about the venture 
capitalists. Maybe because of this limited information, a lot of the success of venture capital 
backed companies has been attributed to the monitoring and oversight of venture capitalists. 
There is some empirical evidence to support this assertion but researchers De Carvalho et al. 
(2008) recognized that venture capitalists, in many instances, reuse CEOs within venture backed 
firms and they argue that this practice may help to explain the success of venture backed 
companies.  The authors label this practice recycling.  
 This dissertation empirically tests the primary premise of De Carvalho et al.’s study 
(2008) in that I examine the quality of recycled CEOs then determine the significance of their 
association to future firm performance. For purposes of this study, I consider a CEO at a venture 
backed firm, who has prior CEO experience at another venture backed firm, to be a recycled 
CEO. While prior literature focuses on the actions of venture capitalists, there are no known 
studies that specifically focus on recycled CEOs and their contributions to newly public 
companies. Earlier literature explores the differences in the quality of executive managers of 
venture backed companies verses the quality of executive managers of non-venture backed 
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companies. And there is extant literature on serial CEOs that examine the increasing prevalence 
of serial CEOs and their association to future profitability.  
 Before determining the relationship between recycled CEOs and future firm performance, 
this dissertation measures the quality, or managerial ability, of recycled CEOs. As a measure of 
managerial ability, I use the Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013) managerial ability score (MA-Score) 
which is available on Peter Demerjian’s website. This score is created by analyzing the inputs 
(COGS, advertising, research and development, etc.) and outputs (revenue) of all public 
companies that date back to 1980. A score is created for each public company with the necessary 
information, then each score is regressed on firm fixed effects. The residual for each company is 
considered the MA-Score. By combining this MA-Score with this study’s hand collected sample 
of serial and recycled CEOs, this dissertation is able to examine the comparative contributions of 
recycled CEOs.  
Summary of Findings 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 examine the MA-Score mean differences between serial versus non-
serial CEOs and the mean differences between recycled and non-recycled CEOs respectively. 
The sample used for hypothesis 1 is the full sample of 1,169 firm years split between serial 
CEOs (179) and non-serial CEOs (200). This sample also consists of 300 companies. In the 
univariate test of H1, a significant difference is found between the mean MA-Score of serial 
CEOs and non-serial CEOs which provides support to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, this 
study finds that there is a significant difference between the mean MA-Scores of serial CEOs and 
non-serial CEOs. 
Similar results are found for hypothesis 2 that analyzes the mean difference in MA-Score 
for recycled CEOs and non-recycled CEOs. This sample includes only serial CEOS since 
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recycled CEOs are a particular type of serial CEO. In other words, this sample is a comparison of 
two different types of serial CEOs: CEOs with CEO experience at two different companies, and 
CEOs with CEO experience at two different venture backed companies. Here the comparison is 
59 recycled CEOs with 120 non-recycled CEOs. As with hypothesis 1, this study finds a 
significant difference in the means of the MA-scores of recycled versus non-recycled CEOs. 
Therefore, evidence supports rejecting the null for hypothesis 2 because there is evidence that 
recycled CEOs are of higher ability than non-recycled CEOs.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 examine the relationships of venture backing to future managerial 
ability and  the relationship of serial CEOs to future managerial ability respectively. The sample 
used for hypothesis 3 consists of IPO-year observations and their corresponding one- and three-
year ahead managerial ability (MA-Score). There are 300 companies in this sample which 
represent 300 firm years. This examination finds no significant association between venture 
backing and future MA-Score, one-year ahead but there is a significant and positive association 
between venture backing and three-years ahead managerial ability. This finding supports 
hypotheses 3.  
The sample used for hypothesis 4 also consists of IPO-year observations and their 
corresponding one- and three-year ahead managerial ability (MA-Score). 300 companies are 
represented with 300 firm years. This examination finds no significant association between serial 
CEOs and future MA-Score, one-year ahead but there is a significant yet negative association 
between serial CEOs and three-years ahead managerial ability. This finding supports hypotheses 
4 but the relationship is negative, not positive. A possible reason for this may be that serial CEOs 
are more focused on profitability and not necessarily on turning resources into revenue.  
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Hypotheses 5 and 6 examine the relationships of recycled CEOs to future managerial 
ability. The sample used for hypotheses 5 and 6 consists of IPO-year observations and their 
corresponding one- and three-year ahead managerial ability (MS-Score). Again, 300 companies 
are represented with 300 firm years. This examination finds a significant and positive association 
between recycled CEOs and future MA-Score for both one- and three-years ahead (hypothesis 
5). Hypothesis 6 exams the full model for the relationship of venture backing, serial CEOs, and 
recycled CEOS to future managerial ability (MA-Score). Still, recycled CEOs have a significant 
and positive relationship to future managerial ability score. Therefore, this dissertation finds 
empirical support for hypotheses 6.  
Hypothesis 7 examines the relationship between recycled CEOs and future profitability 
(ROA). Unadjusted and adjusted ROA one- and three- years post IPO are examined. Here a 
propensity-score matched sample is used and consists of 52 recycled CEOs that are matched with 
39 non-recycled CEOs. A negative significant relationship between recycled CEOs and future 
ROA for both unadjusted and adjusted is found. This empirical evidence supports hypothesis 7. 
Finally, hypothesis 8 examines the relationship between recycled CEOs and buy-and-
hold-adjusted returns (BHAR). The sample used here is the IPO-year sample of 300 firm years 
and 300 company. This study finds no significant relationship between recycled CEOs and 
BHAR. The reason for this outcome may be due to the type of companies in the study. This 
study consists of newly public companies that are one- and three- years post IPO. Therefore, 
these types of companies may have fluctuating returns.  
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that recycled CEOs are of high ability and add 
value above venture backing and serial CEOs when considering future managerial ability. 
Managerial ability, or the ability to turn resources into revenue, has a positive relationship with 
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recycled CEOs. The managerial ability measure (Demerjian et al. 2012, 2013) employed in this 
study is shown to have a positive association to earnings quality (Demerjian et al. 2012, 2013), 
an inverse relationship to audit fees and going concerns (Krishnan et al. 2014), and an inverse 
relationship to reductions in corporate income tax payments (Koester, Shevlin, and Wangerin 
2016). Although this study finds that recycled CEOs do not have a positive relationship to future 
ROA, it appears that recycled CEOs do a good job at turning resources into revenue, maybe at 
the expense of profitability. The positive relationship found between serial CEOs and future 
ROA provides additional support for past research and adds to the growing literature on serial 
CEOs.  
Limitations  
 As with all empirical research, this dissertation has its limitations. First, the observations 
used in the analyses only consist of publicly traded corporations and must meet certain minimum 
criteria. To the extent these corporations differ from private companies or corporations excluded 
from the analysis due to lack of data availability, the results of this study may not generalize to 
the full population.  
Another limitation of this study is the assumption that venture capitalists find CEOs from 
other venture backed companies solely by networking with other venture capitalists. It is possible 
that CEOs were recruited by head hunters or recommended by associates other than venture 
capitalists.  
Contributions 
 The main contribution of this paper is to provide an additional explanation for post IPO 
performance of venture backed and non-venture backed companies as discussed by De Carvalho 
et al. (2008). These findings are important because most of the literature on venture backing 
 85 
 
success focuses on the venture capitalists, and not on the CEOs who are set in place to lead the 
company. CEO ability and CEO involvement in young growth companies has been overlooked. 
This study contributes to the venture capital and managerial ability literature by considering 
CEO experience and venture backing, as an indicator of management quality in young growth 
companies.  
This study also provides empirical evidence of an overlooked subgroup of serial CEOs which 
makes this information useful to academics, analysts, investors and venture capitalists.  
Future Research 
Testing the concept of recycled CEOs provides insight into the success of venture backed 
companies. Recycled CEO information may open a new stream of research that can address 
financial statement quality, venture capital oversight, audit quality, and entrepreneurial success. 
While the empirical results are informative to the literature and to practitioners, they also open 
several research opportunities to improve our understanding of private equity involvement and 
the success of venture backed firms.  
Future research can focus on IPOs that occurred prior to the 2008 financial crisis, specific 
focus can be on the selection process or overall managerial ability score. This time frame will 
also provide a longer period for post IPO results. Since this study focuses on post-IPO 
performance, a pre-IPO analysis of recycled and serial CEOs may provide more insight into the 
success and failures of CEO influence as well. Finally, another area of focus can be on CEO 
compensation for recycled CEOs and the relationship to financial statement quality or future 
performance.  
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Variables used in models
Beta = Market model beta estimated using rolling regressions over no more than 60 
months (but a minimum of 30 months
BHAR = [Buy-and-hold Abnormal Return] = Value-weighted industry (3-digit SIC mean) 
adjusted returns cumulated from the beginning of the fourth month of year t+1 
through the end of the third month of year t+2
BM = [Book-to-Market] = total Common Equity [ceq] divided by MVE
CapEx = [Capital Expenditures] = capital expenditures [capx] divided by average Net 
Operating Assets [NOA]
CEO Age = Age as reported in company prospectus, company website, or Bloomberg.com.
CFF = [CASH Flows from Financing Activities] = cash flows from financing activities 
from the statement of cash flows divided by the MVE at the beginning of the year
CFI = [CASH Flows from Investing Activities] = cash flows from investing activities 
from the statement of cash flows divided by the MVE at the beginning of the year
CFO = [Cash Flows from Operating Activities] = income before extraordinary items [ib] 
plus depreciation expense [dp] minus sccruals divided by average Net Operating 
Assets [NOA] defined by Desai et al. (2004)
FIN = [Net Financial Assets] = financial assets [ivst + ivao] minus financial liabilities 
[dltt + dlc + pstk] defined by Richardson et al. (2005)
Firm Age = Annual age measured from the company's start date, prior to the company's IPO
GRAS = [Growth in Assets] = ((total assets (at)  at time t minus total assets t-1) scaled by 
prior year total assets))
MA-Score = Managerial ability - The decile rank (by industry and year) of the MA-Score 
(managerial efficiency from Demerjian et al. (2012)) in year t.
MVE = [Market Value of Equity] Prcc_f (price close - annual - fiscal) x CHSO (common 
shares outstanding).
Momentum = Cumulative stock return over prior six months
NCO = [Non-Current Operating Accruals] = Non-current operating assets [at - act - ivao] 
minus non-current operating liabilities [lt - lco - dltt] defined by Richardson et al. 
(2005)
Price = Annual Fiscal Year Price Close [prcc_f]
Recycle = a CEO at a venture backed company with prior CEO experience at another 
venture backed company. Dummy variable set to 1 if recycled  and 0 otherwise
ROA = Net income before extraordinary items [ibc] scaled by total assets [AT]
Serial = [Serial CEO] a CEO that has prior CEO experience at another company. Dummy 
variable is set to 1 if Serial CEO and 0 otherwise
Tenure = CEO years of service at one company
Log_Size = Log of [MVE] Market Value of Equity (Prcc_f  x  CSHO)
VB = [Venture Backed Company] a dummy variable set to 1 if company is backed by 
venture capital
WC = [Working Capital] = Working capital accruals defined as current operating assets 
[act - che] minus current operating liabilities [lco - dlc] defined by Richardson et 
al. (2005)
APPENDIX A
Variable Definitions
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Panel A - No outliers
CEO Name
Prior 
Company 
TIC
Year CEO 
left 
Company
Prior Co. 
ROA
New 
Company 
TIC
Year CEO 
started at 
new Co.
Beginning 
ROA at 
current Co.
Difference 
in ROAs
Faheem Hasnain RCPT 2013 -0.6784 FACT 2010 -0.334 -0.344
Antonius Schuh TROV 2011 -0.9915 SRNE 2011 -0.708 -0.283
Marc Beer AEGR 2010 -0.4451 VIAC 2007 -0.259 -0.186
Anthony Bettencourt IMPV 2014 -0.1229 IWOV 2009 0.061 -0.184
Godfrey Sullivan SPLK 2008 -0.0939 HYSL 2007 0.064 -0.158
Robert D. Thomas BLOX 2004 -0.0338 NSCN 2004 0.105 -0.139
Frank Slootman NOW 2011 -0.0781 DDUP 2009 0.056 -0.134
David G. Dewalt FEYE 2012 -0.0877 MFE 2011 0.044 -0.131
Mark McLaughlin PANW 2011 0.0018 VRSN 2011 0.075 -0.073
Kleanthis Xanthopoulous RGLS 2007 -0.1682 ANDS 2006 -0.299 0.131
Sean Moriarity LFGR 2014 -0.4288 TKTM 2009 -0.589 0.160
Mark Pincus ZNGA 2007 -0.1607 SPRT 1999 -0.764 0.603
Total Mean ROA -0.274 -0.213 -0.061
Panel B - With outliers
CEO Name
Prior 
Company 
TIC
Year CEO 
left 
Company
Prior Co. 
ROA
New 
Company 
TIC
Year CEO 
started at 
new Co.
Beginning 
ROA at 
current Co.
Difference 
in ROAs
Faheem Hasnain RCPT 2013 -0.6784 FACT 2010 -0.334 -0.344
Antonius Schuh TROV 2011 -0.9915 SRNE 2011 -0.708 -0.283
Marc Beer AEGR 2010 -0.4451 VIAC 2007 -0.259 -0.186
Anthony Bettencourt IMPV 2014 -0.1229 IWOV 2009 0.061 -0.184
Godfrey Sullivan SPLK 2008 -0.0939 HYSL 2007 0.064 -0.158
Robert D. Thomas BLOX 2004 -0.0338 NSCN 2004 0.105 -0.139
Frank Slootman NOW 2011 -0.0781 DDUP 2009 0.056 -0.134
David G. Dewalt FEYE 2012 -0.0877 MFE 2011 0.044 -0.131
Mark McLaughlin PANW 2011 0.0018 VRSN 2011 0.075 -0.073
Kleanthis Xanthopoulous RGLS 2007 -0.1682 ANDS 2006 -0.299 0.131
Sean Moriarity LFGR 2014 -0.4288 TKTM 2009 -0.589 0.160
Mark Pincus ZNGA 2007 -0.1607 SPRT 1999 -0.764 0.603
John Orwin RLYP 2013 -1.9379 AFFY 2013 -0.642 1.296
Richard M. Rosenblatt LFGR 2006 -5.7147 KOOP 2001 -0.031 5.683
Total Mean ROA -0.781 -0.230 0.446
This table shows the profitability measure of recycled CEOs who were at a public venture backed company then hired at another 
public venture backed company. Panel A presents the ROA measure without the the two outliers of John Orwin and Richard 
Rosenblatt (highlighted in Panel B). Their respective ROAs (at prior company) are -1.938 and -5.715.
APPENDIX B
Recycled CEOs Prior Company ROA compared to Current Company ROA 
Prior Company Current Company
Prior Company Current Company
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Panel A - No outliers
CEO Name
Prior 
Company 
TIC
Year CEO 
left 
Company
Ending MA-
Score at 
Prior Co.
New 
Company 
TIC
Year CEO 
started at 
new Co.
Beginning 
MA-Score at 
new Co.
Difference 
in MA-
Score
Faheem Hasnain ZNGA 2007 0.619 SPRT 1999 -0.131 0.750
Antonius Schuh SPLK 2008 0.318 HYSL 2007 0.037 0.281
Marc Beer AEGR 2010 0.227 VIAC 2007 -0.012 0.240
Anthony Bettencourt IMPV 2014 0.092 IWOV 2009 0.016 0.076
Godfrey Sullivan RGLS 2007 -0.114 ANDS 2006 -0.182 0.068
Robert D. Thomas RCPT 2013 -0.137 FACT 2010 -0.200 0.063
Frank Slootman PANW 2011 0.178 VRSN 2011 0.119 0.059
David G. Dewalt LFGR 2014 -0.061 TKTM 2009 -0.103 0.042
Mark McLaughlin NOW 2011 0.108 DDUP 2009 0.082 0.027
Kleanthis Xanthopoulous TROV 2011 -0.056 SRNE 2011 -0.064 0.008
Sean Moriarity BLOX 2004 -0.028 NSCN 2004 0.178 -0.206
Mark Pincus FEYE 2012 -0.023 MFE 2011 0.262 -0.285
Total MA-Score 0.094 0.000 0.094
Panel B - With outliers
CEO Name
Prior 
Company 
TIC
Year CEO 
left 
Company
Ending MA-
Score at 
Prior Co.
New 
Company 
TIC
Year CEO 
started at 
new Co.
Beginning 
MA-Score at 
new Co.
Difference 
in MA-
Score
Faheem Hasnain ZNGA 2007 0.619 SPRT 1999 -0.131 0.750
Antonius Schuh SPLK 2008 0.318 HYSL 2007 0.037 0.281
Marc Beer AEGR 2010 0.227 VIAC 2007 -0.012 0.240
Anthony Bettencourt IMPV 2014 0.092 IWOV 2009 0.016 0.076
Godfrey Sullivan RGLS 2007 -0.114 ANDS 2006 -0.182 0.068
Robert D. Thomas RCPT 2013 -0.137 FACT 2010 -0.200 0.063
Frank Slootman PANW 2011 0.178 VRSN 2011 0.119 0.059
David G. Dewalt LFGR 2014 -0.061 TKTM 2009 -0.103 0.042
Mark McLaughlin NOW 2011 0.108 DDUP 2009 0.082 0.027
Kleanthis Xanthopoulous TROV 2011 -0.056 SRNE 2011 -0.064 0.008
Sean Moriarity BLOX 2004 -0.028 NSCN 2004 0.178 -0.206
Mark Pincus FEYE 2012 -0.023 MFE 2011 0.262 -0.285
John Orwin LFGR 2006 -0.001 KOOP 2001 -0.174 -0.173
Richard M. Rosenblatt RLYP 2013 -0.194 AFFY 2013 NA
Total MA-Score 0.066 -0.013 0.073
This table shows the managerial ability measure of recycled CEOs who were at a public venture backed company then hired at 
another public venture backed company. Panel A presents the MA-Score without the the two outliers of John Orwin and Richard 
Rosenblatt (highlighted in Panel B).
APPENDIX C
Recycled CEOs Prior Company MA- Score compared to New Company MA-Score
Prior Company Current Company
Prior Company Current Company
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CEO Company Name CEO Company Name
Keith R. Leonard Kythera Biopharma Inc Tuan Ha-Ngoc Aveo Pharmaceuticals, Inc
Kleanthis Xanthopoulous Regulus Therapeutics Inc Zorik Gordon Reachlocal, Inc
Christopher Lien Marin Software Inc Jeffrey Stein Trius Therapeutics, Inc
Kenneth L. Moch Chimerix, Inc Tim Jenks Neophotonics Corp
Faheem Hasnain Receptos Inc Elon Musk Tesla, Inc
Mark Floyd Cyan Inc Clifford Reid Complete Genomics, Inc
Robert Palay Cellular Dynamics Intl Inc. Adam Miller Cornerstone Ondemand, Inc
Pamela Marrone Marrone Bio Innovations Richard M. Rosenblatt Leaf Group LTD
Martin Plaehn Control4 Corp Daniel Springer Responsys, Inc
David G. Dewalt Fireeye, Inc David Friend Carbonite, Inc
Dick Costolo Twitter, Inc Paul Nahi Enphase Energy, Inc
Pardeep Kohli Mavenir Systems, Inc Mark Pincus Zynga, Inc
Michael Kauffman Karyopharm Therapeutics, Inc Gordon Nye Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc
John Orwin Relypsa, Inc Thomas Ebling Demandware, Inc
Douglas C. Robinson Lifevantage Corp Robert Zollars Vocera Communications, Inc
Antonius Schuh Trovagene Inc Jeremy Allaire Brightcove, Inc
Robert D. Thomas Infoblox Inc Joseph P. Payne Eloqua, Inc
Godfrey Sullivan Splunk Inc Brett A. Hurt Bazaarvoice, Inc
Frank Slootman Servicenow Inc Sang Park Magnachip Semiconductor Corp
Mark Mclaughlin Palo Alto Networks Inc Jill D. Smith Digitalglobe, Inc
Marc Beer Aegerion Pharmaceuticals Inc Mark Heaney Addus
David Perry Anacor Pharmaceuticals, Inc Ken Xie Fortinet, Inc
Michael Bennett Solarwinds, Inc
Total 45
This is a list of all recycled CEOs for the smaller IPO-year database. 
APPENDIX D
List of Recycled CEOs - IPO Year Sample
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CEO Company Name CEO Company Name
Keith R. Leonard Kythera Biopharma Inc Tuan Ha-Ngoc Aveo Pharmaceuticals, Inc
Kleanthis Xanthopoulous Regulus Therapeutics Inc Zorik Gordon Reachlocal, Inc
Christopher Lien Marin Software Inc Jeffrey Stein Trius Therapeutics, Inc
Kenneth L. Moch Chimerix, Inc Tim Jenks Neophotonics Corp
Faheem Hasnain Receptos Inc Elon Musk Tesla, Inc
Mark Floyd Cyan Inc Ford Tamer Inphi Corp
Robert Palay Cellular Dynamics Intl Inc. Behrooz Abdi Invensense, Inc
Pamela Marrone Marrone Bio Innovations Clifford Reid Complete Genomics, Inc
Martin Plaehn Control4 Corp Adam Miller Cornerstone Ondemand, Inc
David G. Dewalt Fireeye, Inc Richard M. Rosenblatt Leaf Group LTD
Dick Costolo Twitter, Inc Sean Moriarty Leaf Group LTD
Jack Dorsey Twitter, Inc Christopher Carrington Servicesource Intl Inc
Pardeep Kohli Mavenir Systems, Inc Daniel Springer Responsys, Inc
Michael Kauffman Karyopharm Therapeutics, Inc David Friend Carbonite, Inc
John Orwin Relypsa, Inc Mohamad Ali Carbonite, Inc
Douglas C. Robinson Lifevantage Corp Paul Nahi Enphase Energy, Inc
Antonius Schuh Trovagene Inc Anthony Bettencourt Imperva, Inc
Robert D. Thomas Infoblox Inc Mark Pincus Zynga, Inc
Michael Barrett Millennial Media Inc Don Mattrick Zynga, Inc
Godfrey Sullivan Splunk Inc Gordon Nye Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc
Frank Slootman Servicenow Inc Thomas Ebling Demandware, Inc
Mark Mclaughlin Palo Alto Networks Inc Bruce McWilliams Intermolecular, Inc
Marc Beer Aegerion Pharmaceuticals Inc Robert Zollars Vocera Communications, Inc
Thomas J. Reilly Arcsight, Inc. Jeremy Allaire Brightcove, Inc
David Perry Anacor Pharmaceuticals, Inc David Mendels Brightcove, Inc
Michael Bennett Solarwinds, Inc Joseph P. Payne Eloqua, Inc
Jill D. Smith Digitalglobe, Inc Brett A. Hurt Bazaarvoice, Inc
John Hass Rosetta Stone, Inc Gene Austin Bazaarvoice, Inc
Mark Heaney Addus Sang Park Magnachip Semiconductor Corp
Ken Xie Fortinet, Inc
Total 59
This is a list of recycled CEOs for the full sample, not just IPO year
APPENDIX E
List of Recycled CEOs - Full Sample
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Business Address 
Providence College 
1 Cunningham Square 
Providence RI, 02918 
 
VITA 
 
Sydnee C. Manley 
CPA (AR inactive) 
smanley@go.olemiss.edu 
 
 
 
 
Home Address 
2 Lucille Street 
Providence, RI 02908 
Mobile: 501-730-4475 
 
EDUCATION 
E.H. Patterson School of Accountancy, University of Mississippi 
Doctor of Philosophy in Accountancy, Degree Anticipated May 2018 
 
Georgia State University 
Master of Business Administration (emphasis finance), March 1998 
 
University of Arkansas 
Bachelor of Science – Accounting, August 1990 
 
RESEARCH 
Dissertation topic: 
“Recycled CEOs and Managerial Ability: Do Venture-Backed Companies have a 
Comparative Advantage?” 
 
Working papers: 
“Examining Cash Flow Based Life Cycle and the Value-Glamour Anomaly” 
 
“American Latino Professionals in Finance and Accounting, Fifty Years (2022) of 
Influence – An Interview with the Founders”  
 
 
Research Interests:  
Venture capitalism, earnings quality, entrepreneurship, managerial ability and earnings 
management  
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
University of Mississippi 
Financial Accounting               2012 – 2016 
Managerial Accounting       2013 – 2017 
 
University of Central Arkansas 
Principles of Accounting I & II (part-time)       2006 – 2009 
 
Teacher evaluations 
Summer 2016         4.33/5.00 
Fall 2015         3.54/5.00 
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Alltel/Verizon Wireless  
Quality Analyst                  2004 – 2010 
 
Wise Foods, Inc. 
Senior Financial Analyst      2002 – 2004 
 
Arthur Andersen, LLP                        
Senior Financial Analyst       2000 – 2002 
 
Bank of America          
Senior Financial Analyst           1998 – 2000 
 
Georgia State University  
Research Assistant               1996 – 1998 
 
Division of Legislative Audit 
Senior Auditor                1991 – 1996 
 
Kremer & Associates, LLC 
Staff Auditor          1989 – 1991 
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CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES 
AAA Annual Meeting 
San Diego, CA 2017 
 Moderator - Using Beautiful Models for Valuation 
 
 New York, NY 2016 
Chicago, IL 2015 
Atlanta, GA 2014 
Anaheim, CA 2013 
Washington, DC 2012 
 
The PhD Project Accounting Doctoral Students Association Annual Meeting  
 San Diego, CA 2017 
   
Chicago, IL 2015 
Presenter – “Examining Cash Flow Based Life Cycle and the Value Glamour 
Anomaly” 
 
Atlanta, GA 2014 
 
Anaheim, CA 2013 
Discussant – “The Impact of FIN48 on Earnings Management” by C. Bowler 
 
Washington, DC 2012 
 
AAA FARS Midyear Meeting 
 Chicago, IL 2012 
Nashville, TN 2015 
 
Accounting PhD Rookie Recruiting & Research Camp (observer) 
Miami, FL 2014 
 
AAA Diversity Section 
Atlanta, GA 2014 
 
New Orleans, LA 2017 
  Emerging Research Presenter – “Recycled CEOs and Managerial Ability: Do  
Venture-Backed Companies have a Comparative Advantage?” 
   
  Moderator – Gender & Diversity Issues in Financial Reporting 
 
The PhD Project Conference 
Chicago, IL 2003 and 2000 
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FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS 
3 Minute Thesis finalist – University of Mississippi 
             Fall 2017  
AICPA Doctoral Fellowship 
 2013 – Present 
 
KPMG Foundation Doctoral Scholarship 
 2012 – 2017 
 
University of Mississippi Minority Fellowship 
 2011 - Present 
 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS 
Accounting Doctoral Student Association                 2012 - Present 
Board member – Conway Housing Authority                   2010 – 2013 
Inactive member – Arkansas Society of Certified Public Accountants 
 
 
